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SOME ASPECTS OF EVIDENCE IN
ADJUDICATIONS BY ADMINISTRATIVE
AGENCIES IN NORTH CAROLINAt
FRANK W. HANFT*
I. THE STRICT EVIDENCE REQUIREMENTS OF A 1967 ACT
In 1967 the General Assembly of North Carolina enacted a statute
(hereinafter referred to as the 1967 Act) which in its literal language
sweepingly reversed a long continued trend in administrative law concern-
ing evidence before administrative tribunals in cases to be decided by them.
The tendency in this state, other states, and the federal government had
been to relax the rules of evidence in adjudications by administrative
agencies.
The 1967 Act defines "administrative agency" as "any State authority,
board, bureau, commission, committee, department, or officer authorized
by law to make administrative decisions," but it excepts agencies in the
legislative and judicial departments of government, the Utilities Com-
mission, the Industrial Commission, the Employment Security Commis-
sion, and institutions and agencies operating under chapters 115, 115A,
and 116 of the General Statutes which deal with education.4
The 1967 Act defines "proceeding" as one before an administrative
t This article was prepared in cooperation with the North Carolina Law Center.
* Graham Kenan Professor of Law, University of North Carolina.
'N.C. Gm. STAT. §§ 143-317, -318 (Supp. 1969).
2 The term "administrative agency" will be used in this article to designate any
officer, commission, board, bureau, department, or governmental body other than
a court or legislature which, in addition to executive or administrative powers,
also has the power to decide cases between litigants-power judicial in nature-
and/or the power to make rules and regulations-power legislative in nature. It
is the exercise of the power judicial in nature with which we are concerned here.
' The use of the term "State" raises the question whether the act applies to
county and municipal agencies. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 143-306 to -316 (1964), the
statute providing generally for judicial review of decisions of administrative
agencies, also defines, specifically section 143-306(1), "administrative agency"
as any "State" officer, etc. The definitions in section 143-306 were probably used
in part in the drafting of the definitions in the 1967 Act; some of the language
is verbatim. In Jarrell v. Board of Adjustment, 258 N.C. 476, 128 S.E.2d 879
(1963), the court applied the general judicial review statute to a municipal agency.
'N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-317(1) (Supp. 1969). Another exception to the applica-
tion of the 1967 Act is made by N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-241.1(h) (Supp. 1969), in
the case of hearings before the Commissioner of Revenue pursuant to N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 105-241 (1965).
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agency of the state "wherein the legal rights, duties, or privileges of
specific parties are required by law or by constitutional right to be deter-
mined after an opportunity for agency hearing."' The application of the
Act, therefore, is plainly to adjudications and not to the process of making
general regulations."
The part of the Act that threw into reverse the trend of the law con-
cerning rules of evidence before administrative agencies is the provision
that in all proceedings, "[i]ncompetent, irrelevant, immaterial, unduly
repetitious, and hearsay evidence shall be excluded. The rules of evidence
as applied in the superior and district court divisions of the General Court
of Justice shall be followed."7
Problems of interpretation are visible. Read literally, the provision
that hearsay shall be excluded would apply to all hearsay. But in the law
of evidence there are exceptions to the hearsay rule" including declarations
against interest,9 entries in the regular course of business,' 0 market re-
ports," and many others. It would be extraordinary if evidence admissible
before a court and jury in a civil action under exceptions to the hearsay
rule were made inadmissible in the less formal proceedings of an admin-
istrative agency, and it is difficult to believe that the legislature intended
what it literally said. What it probably meant was that hearsay not with-
in any exception to the hearsay rule shall be excluded. This conclusion is
borne out by the more general statement in the statute that rules of evidence
as applied in the superior and district courts shall be followed. Such rules
would not be followed if an administrative agency were to exclude hearsay
of the type competent in a court.
But the provision that the rules of evidence as applied in the superior
and district court divisions shall be followed introduces a further am-
biguity. Nothing is said as to whether this means the rules in jury trials
or in trials by the judge without a jury. The rules as applied in the two
types of hearings are not necessarily the same. The Supreme Court of
North Carolina has said, in a case in which the lower court admitted
IN.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-317(3) (Supp. 1969).
'The terms "rule" and "regulation," in accord with the general practice in ad-
ministrative law, are herein used as synonyms.
"N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-318(1) (Supp. 1969) (emphasis added).
8 D. STANSBURY, THE NoRTH CAROLINA LAW OF EVIDENCE §§ 144-65 (2d ed.
1963) [hereinafter cited as STANSBuRY].
Id. § 147.
0 Id. § 155.
"' Id. § 165.
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hearsay, "But 'in a hearing by the court under agreement of the parties,
the rules of evidence are not so strictly enforced as in a trial by jury, since
it will be presumed that incompetent evidence was disregarded by the
court in making its decision.' ,12 Professor Davis has come to the well
documented conclusion that there is no body of rules adhered to by courts
in nonjury cases.13
Nevertheless, when the provision that the rules of evidence as applied
in the superior and district courts shall be followed is read along with the
provision that incompetent evidence shall be excluded, it would seem that
the legislature intended that the rules as applied in jury trial cases, not
cases tried without juries, should be followed. The usual meaning of
"competent evidence" is evidence which is admissible in jury trials.1 4 The
conclusion that the legislature intended to use the term in that sense is
bolstered by the provision that hearsay be excluded.
At any rate so far as the administrative agencies' conduct of pro-
ceedings is concerned, the 1967 Act, in uncompromisingly positive lan-
guage, requires exclusion of hearsay and incompetent evidence. It is to
be assumed that the state's administrative agencies want to abide by law
and also find it prudent to do so. The difficulty is that a great many of
them are manned by persons untrained in the law. It is hardly to be
expected that they will be conspicuously successful in applying the technical,
difficult, and often confused rules of evidence. Even the lower courts
frequently are found on appeal to have erred in applying such rules.' 5
A critical question under the 1967 Act is whether, if an administrative
agency within the coverage of the Act does err by admitting hearsay or
other incompetent evidence, a court on judicial review must hold the de-
cision of the agency to be invalid. Since the 1967 Act flatly states that
the incompetent evidence shall be excluded and since it says that the rules
of evidence as applied in the superior and district courts shall be followed,
it would seem that the failure of the courts to reverse an administrative
" Harris & Harris Constr. Co. v. Crain & Denbo, Inc., 256 N.C. 110, 115, 123&
S.E.2d 590, 593-94 (1962), quoting 4 J. STRONG, NORTH CAROLINA INDEx 363(1961). The difference between the rules of evidence in jury trials and trials before
a judge sitting without a jury is discussed in STANSEURY § 4a.
" 2 K. DAvis, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw TREATISE § 14.04 (1958) [hereinafter
cited as DAvis]. A much different view is set out in 1 F. COOPER, STATE ADMIN-
ISTRATIVE LAW 379-87 (1965) [hereinafter cited as COOPER].
12 Davis § 14.05.
1 R. BENJAMIN, REPORT, ADMINISTRATIVE ADJUDICATION IN THE STATE OF
NEw YoRi 174 (1942).
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agency which has violated the statute would constitute a refusal to apply
the law so positively stated by the legislature. It might, however, be
argued that where statutory provisions for judicial review say that the
reviewing court may reverse for error of law, not that it must,"0 there is
room for the Supreme Court of North Carolina to continue to adhere to
its usual rule, elaborated hereinafter, that the admission of incompetent
evidence will not invalidate an agency's decision so long as there is also
competent evidence to support it. A reviewing court finding such error
on the part of an administrative agency might hold the error to be non-
prejudicial and apply the general rule of judicial review' 7 that erroneous
admission of evidence is not ground for reversal if the error is non-
prejudical.
For the purposes of appraising the 1967 Act, a number of general ob-
servations will be made at the inception of this article, some of which will be
spelled out in more detail later in this article.
For example, it should be noted that the explosive increase in the num-
ber of administrative agencies over the course of less than a century con-
stitutes a highly significant change in the whole legal order. This develop-
ment may be compared to the appearance of equity centuries ago."8 Mr.
Justice Jackson has stated,
The rise of administrative bodies probably has been the most significant
legal trend of the last century and perhaps more values today are
affected by their decisions than by those of all the courts, review of
administrative decisions apart . . . . They have become a veritable
fourth branch of the Government, which has deranged our three-branch
legal theories much as the concept of a fourth dimension unsettles our
three-dimensional thinking.' 9
Professor Davis brings out the fact that in 1963 the number of civil cases
filed in all federal district courts was 63,630, whereas the number of cases
filed in the federal administrative agencies numbered in the millions. Most
of the administrative adjudications were informal, but even the formal ad-
judications by the agencies were many times the number of those by the
"
8N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-315 (1964) (providing generally for judicial review
of administrative agency decisions); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150-27 (1964) (providing
for judicial review of decisions of licensing boards).
STANSBURY § 9.
18 "Administrative law, like equity, developed to meet a common-law defi-
ciency ... ." P. WOLL, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, THE INFORMAL PROCESS 8 (1963).
" FTC v. Ruberoid Co., 343 U.S. 470, 487 (1952) (dissenting opinion).
[Vol. 49
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courts." Besides the numerous federal administrative agencies,2 according
to Professor Davis the average state probably has more than one hundred
agencies with powers of adjudication or rule making or both.22 No one
knows, he adds, how many administrative agencies have been created by
municipalities and other units of local government. "The number may be
in the tens of thousands. '
The reasons for the phenomenal rise of administrative agencies have a
direct bearing on the problem of what the law should be concerning evidence
in adjudications by such agencies. Included in the reasons for the rise of
the agencies and the granting to them of power to decide a vast variety
of cases in the fields of their specialties is the fact that the courts are not
specialized and are inexpert in such fields and the belief that their pro-
cedures are too slow, cumbersome, and costly.2" Conversely, there has been
a belief that agencies manned by experts deciding cases in the fields of their
specialization are able to arrive at better informed decisions more ex-
peditiously than courts. This belief rested in part on the view that by reason
of their expertise and specialization, administrative agencies could appraise
the value of evidence and determine its weight and that, therefore, they
should not be bound by technical rules developed largely to prevent juries
from being swayed by evidence of little or no value in the ascertainment
of facts.25
However, the argument in favor of simply dispensing with the tech-
nical rules of evidence in the case of administrative agencies is not con-
clusive. The expertness of the members of some of the agencies may be
more theoretical than real: Their appointment may be for political reasons,
1 DAvis § 1.02 (Supp. 1965).
a' Some idea of the number of federal agencies may be obtained by consulting
the list of agencies issuing regulations as revealed by the Table of CFR Titles and
Chapters to be found in 1 C.F.R. 231-39 (1970).
22 1 DAvis § 1.02, at 13. N.C. MANUAL 341 (1969), lists governmental boards
and commissions. The variety of state administrative agencies is discussed in 1
CooPER 1-2.
2' 1 DAVIS § 1.02, at 14.
2
'Id. § 1.05.
" [T]he jury-trial rules are intended for a constantly changing tribunal of
fact composed of inexperienced jurymen dealing with hundreds of types of
cases. When the tribunal is composed of experienced professional men,
habitually inquiring day after day into the same Hinted class of facts (as
happens with most administrative boards), an expert weighing of evidence
can generally be counted upon.
1 J. WIGMOaRE, EVIDENCE § 4b, at 36 (3d ed. 1940) [hereinafter cited as WIGMORE].
Arguments of the proponents of the view that the jury-trial rules should not gov-
ern administrative adjudications are set forth in Note, Administrative Lawo--
Evidence before North Carolina Tribunals, 19 N.C.L. REv. 568 (1941).
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and their conduct may be politically motivated; they may be inclined to
make decisions on the basis of surmise and conjecture;20 in short, they may
be subject to inclinations in need of safeguards. A lawyer who has lost
a case before an administrative agency on the basis of hearsay evidence
may feel that if he had in the hearing room before him those who were
the sources of the statements which were produced as hearsay, he could
on cross-examination demolish the statements by showing them to be
uninformed, biased, or downright false. It is this distrust of results
arrived at when rules of evidence are dispensed with that probably ac-
counts for occasional reversions in statutes to the idea of requiring admin-
istrative agencies to abide by the rules of evidence." Lawyers who are
also members of legislatures may have unsatisfactory experiences with
administrative agencies deciding cases of such lawyer-legislators on the
basis of incompetent evidence, and such experiences may spur them to
bring about the enactment of statutes such as the 1967 Act. It is no
complete answer to such a view to say that only reliable hearsay will be
considered by an administrative agency. The agency may want to find
reliable the evidence which supports what it wants to decide.
Furthermore, if the jury-trial rules are simply dispensed with, there
is no other system to replace such rules.2 A generalization commonly
offered as a substitute governing evidence before administrative agencies
is that "the kind of evidence on which responsible persons are accus-
"
8Note, 19 N.C.L. REv., supra note 25, at 570. "[T]he commissioners, whose
terms in office are often short, frequently do not bring to their assignments any
particular professional or technical background ... ." 1 COOPER 5. The statement
concerned state administrative agencies. "Legislative agencies, with varying qual-
ifications, work in a field peculiarly exposed to political demands. Some may be
expert and impartial, others subservient." St. Joseph Stock Yards Co. v. United
States, 298 U.S. 38, 52 (1936).
' An illustration of such a reversion is to be found in the National Labor
Relations Act. As originally enacted it provided, concerning unfair labor practice
cases before the National Labor Relations Board, "In any such proceeding the rules
of evidence prevailing in courts of law or equity shall not be controlling." National
Labor Relations Act § 10(b), 49 Stat. 454 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 160(b)
(1964). This language was changed to read, "Any such proceeding shall, so far
as practicable, be conducted in accordance with the rules of evidence applicable in
the district courts of the United States under the rules of civil procedure for the
district courts of the United States . . . ." Labor Management Relations Act
§ 10(b), 29 U.S.C. § 160(b) (1964). The 1967 North Carolina Act contains no
such language as "so far as practicable."
8 Professor Wigmore opposed subjecting administrative agencies to the jury-
trial rules of evidence, but he also opposed leaving them without any rules at all.
He conceded, however, that there was no other system to replace the jury-trial rules.
1 WIGMORE § 4b, at 34-35.
[Vol. 49
ADMINISTRATIVE EVIDENCE RULES
tomed to rely in serious affairs" may be utilized.29 Professor Davis refers
to this formula as a guide."0 That it is an uncertain guide is vouched for
by the fact that one federal court stating the formula said that under it
hearsay evidence could support a finding,"' but another federal court
said responsible persons are not accustomed to rely on hearsay in
serious affairs. The latter court pointed out that the terms "responsible
persons" and "serious affairs" are relative in their meaning, and the
formula "must leave the trier of facts in confusion worse confounded."
' 2
Of course whether responsible persons rely on hearsay in serious affairs
depends a good deal on the nature of the hearsay and of the affairs.
Moreover, members of administrative agencies are not just ordinary men
conducting serious affairs; they are persons expert and specialized deciding
upon matters within their specialty. These facts look toward the con-
clusion that the formula should be spelled out in more specific rules or
replaced by a formula better adapted to administrative adjudication such
as, for example, "evidence persuasive to specialists acting reasonably."
Even though administrative agencies should not be free of controls
concerning evidence, it does not follow that the sound solution is to return
to the jury-trial rules in adjudications by administrative agencies as did
the 1967 Act. For good reasons the great body of administrative law
has rejected such a position. Indeed, the relaxation of the rules of evidence
before administrative agencies may be an influence working toward a
similar result in the courts.
33
It has been noted that the 1967 Act relates to administrative adjudica-
tion, not administrative legislation. The distinction is basic. In making
rules and regulations, administrative agencies are far less restricted in
the kinds of information they may resort to than they are when deciding
cases. When an agency is exercising a legislative function, the hearing
" This formula was stated by Judge Learned Hand in NLRB v. Remington
Rand, Inc., 94 F.2d 862, 873 (2d Cir. 1938).
o 2 DAvis § 14.01.
'NLRB v. Remington Rand, Inc., 94 F.2d 862, 873 (2d Cir. 1938).
"Tyne Co. v. NLRB, 125 F.2d 832, 835 (7th Cir. 1942).
83 2 DAvis § 14.17. In a civil antitrust suit a federal court, overruling objec-
tions to certain evidence, said, "Yet the original demand for administrative adjudica-
tion was traceable, in part at least, to the unwillingness of courts to admit evidence
which they allowed administrative agencies to receive and act upon.... To preserve
their own jurisdiction the courts must in this type of controversy relax the rigidity
of the hearsay rule." United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 89 F. Supp. 349,
356 (D. Mass. 1950). The district court's final decree in the above litigation was
rendered in United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295 (D. Mass.
1953), aff'd per curiam, 347 U.S. 521 (1954).
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may be of the kind afforded by legislative committees. 4 In legislating, it
can be said broadly that the agencies are heirs of the legislative process;
in deciding cases, they can be called heirs of the judicial process.
However, labeling the action of an administrative agency as legislative
or judicial does not necessarily determine whether the agency may use
the broad methods of legislatures in obtaining the information on which
to act, or whether it is bound by the restrictions applicable to evidence
in adjudications. For example, the Supreme Court of the United States
has decided that when an administrative agency prescribes rates for public
utilities, its action is legislative, 5 but the Court has also held that when
an administrative agency fixes rates, a statutory requirement of a "full
hearing" has reference to the tradition of judicial proceedings.' The
Federal Administrative Procedure Act classifies legislative enactments
of administrative agencies as rules, and "rule" includes approval or pre-
scription for the future of rates.3 Procedure for rule making is set forth
in the Act. 8 But it provides that when rules are required by statute to be
made on the record after opportunity for an agency hearing, the pro-
visions of two sections governing adjudications,39 one of which includes
evidence requirements,4" apply instead of the provisions of the subsection
on rule making procedure."- The classification of rate making in the legis-
lative category, then, obviously does not automatically govern evidence
requirements.
"Norwegian Nitrogen Prod. Co. v. United States, 288 U.S. 294 (1933). The
distinction between procedure for rule making and for adjudication is carried
forward into the Federal Administrative Procedure Act, which provides procedure
for rule making [contained in 5 U.S.C. § 553 (Supp. V, 1970)] that is much less
exacting than the procedure for adjudication [contained in 5 U.S.C. §§ 554, 556,
557 (Supp. V, 1970)].
" Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line Co., 211 U.S. 210 (1908).
" Morgan v. United States, 298 U.S. 468 (1936). The Court said further that
there must be evidence adequate to support necessary findings of fact and that
nothing can be treated as evidence which is not introduced as such. In ICC v.
Louisville & N.R.R., 227 U.S. 88, 93 (1913), a rate case, the Court said, "But the
more liberal the practice in admitting testimony, the more imperative the obligation
to preserve the essential rules of evidence by which rights are asserted or defended."
The Supreme Court of North Carolina has required in a rate case that there be
competent, material, and substantial evidence in the record to support the rate base
fixed by the Utilities Commission. State ex rel. Util. Comm'n v. Public Serv.
Co., 257 N.C. 233, 125 S.E.2d 457 (1962).
375 U.S.C. § 551(4) (Supp. V, 1970).
35 U.S.C. § 553 (Supp. V, 1970).
395 U.S.C. §§ 556, 557 (Supp. V, 1970).
" 5 U.S.C. § 556(d) (Supp. V, 1970).
41 5 U.S.C. § 553 (Supp. V, 1970).
[Vol. 49
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Moreover, in making a decision administrative agencies as well as
courts often must determine a rule or policy if none covering the case al-
ready exists. In such a case the tribunal commonly goes beyond the record
to get such light as it can find. Even courts, more closely bound by re-
quirements of procedure and evidence than is usual for administrative
agencies, are increasingly doing their own research in determining the pol-
icy or law to govern the case to be decided.' Professor Davis4P points out
that in the landmark case of Durham v. United States,4 the court, in
holding that a defendant is not criminally responsible if his unlawful act
was the product of mental disease or defect, resorted to opinions of large
numbers of medico-legal writers not put in evidence. judges may even
informally consult law professors, specialists in their fields, seeking light
on law in connection with cases before them.
In administrative adjudications the process of arriving at a remedy in
a particular case is not confined to taking evidence as to what the remedy
should be and then following the evidence. Of course, if a particular
remedy is provided by statute, the statute must be followed, and if the
statute provides boundaries or guides as to the remedy, those must be
observed. But in fashioning a remedy permissible under its statutory
authority, the agency is not confined to evidence taken at the hearing.
In NLRB v. Seven-Up Bottling Co.,45 the NLRB had changed its formula
for awarding back pay to wrongfully discharged employees. The Supreme
Court, in holding valid the application of the new formula, said, "[I]n de-
vising a remedy the Board is not confined to the record of a particular pro-
ceeding." ' The Court justified resort by the Board to its experience and
judgment.
II. GENERAL REVIEW OF CERTAIN NORTH CAROLINA STATUTES
The provisions concerning evidence in administrative adjudications
contained in two North Carolina statutes of general application and in
several specimen statutes relating to some particular agency will be ex-
amined in this part of this article. These provisions cover several matters
that will be differentiated: first, the evidence admissible by the agency;
second, on what evidence the agency may base its decision; third, the scope
of judicial review of the evidence.
"' 2 DAvis § 15.03.As Id.
'"214 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
"344 U.S. 344 (1953).
,0 Id. at 349.
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A. The General Judicial Review Statute
A highly important statute is that which provides generally for judicial
review of decisions of administrative agencies.47 The statute does not by
its terms govern the hearings of the agencies before review. Rather, it
applies to review of decisions of administrative agencies generally except,
among others, those agencies "whose administrative decisions are made
subject to judicial review under some other statute or statutes containing
adequate procedural provisions therefor."4 Aggrieved persons are en-
titled to review under the statute "unless adequate procedure for judicial
review is provided by some other statute."4 The statute gained in im-
portance when the North Carolina Supreme Court held in 1963 that it
applies to municipal administrative agencies and that the judicial review
provisions in another statute are adequate only if the scope of review
therein is equal to that under this statute.50 Put otherwise, this statute
provides the minimum judicial review for decisions of state, including
municipal, administrative agencies.
The statute applies when there has been an administrative decision,
and "administrative decision!' or "decision" is defined as "any decision,
order, or determination rendered by an administrative agency in a pro-
ceeding in which the legal rights, duties, or privileges of specific parties
are required by law or constitutional right to be determined after an
opportunity for agency hearing."51
Save for proceedings by excepted agencies, the statute obviously pro-
vides judicial review for decisions in proceedings governed by the 1967
Act since the Act's definition of "proceeding" which the Act covers52
follows the language quoted above identifying the kind of "proceeding" cov-
ered by the judicial review statute. In other words the 1967 Act applies to
hearings in defined agency proceedings, and the general judicial review
statute provides review of decisions resulting from such proceedings.
The general judicial review statute provides that the reviewing court
may reverse or modify the administrative decision:
"" N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 143-306 to -316 (1964), discussed in A Survey of Stat-
utory Changes in North Carolina in 1953, 31 N.C.L. REv. 75, 382 (1953).
48 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-306(1) (1964).
"N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-307 (1964).50 Jarrell v. Board of Adjustment, 258 N.C. 476, 128 S.E.2d 879 (1963).
81N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-306(2) (1964).
"
2N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-317(3) (Supp. 1969).
[Vol. 49
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If the substantial rights of the petitioners may have been prejudiced
because the administrative findings, inferences, conclusions, or de-
cisions are:
(3) Made upon unlawful procedure; or
(4) Affected by other error of law; or
(5) Unsupported by competent, material, and substantial evidence in
view of the entire record as submitted; or
(6) Arbitrary or capricious. 53
There is no specific provision for reversal for receiving inadmissible
evidence. Such a reversal for admitting evidence contrary to the 1967 Act
could, however, be founded on subsections (3) or (4) above.
The evidence necessary to support a decision is stated in subsection
(5). If the decision by the administrative agency escapes the condemna-
tion of subsection (5), it would seem to escape subsection (6) also so far
as evidence necessary to prevent a decision from being "arbitrary or
capricious" is concerned.5
Subsection (5) requires "competent" evidence. In a caser" in which
the petitioner's right to improve and rent a house as a two-family dwelling
depended on whether two families lived in it at the time a zoning ordinance
went into effect, the city board of adjustment had found that the house was
occupied as a single-family unit at the time the ordinance went into effect.
The board relied on unsworn statements of persons at its hearings, on an
affidavit to the effect that affiant had been told in a telephone conversation
by a husband and wife that they were the only family in the house on the
critical date, and on a letter from the husband to counsel for adverse
parties. The court, citing subsection (5), held that the finding of the board
was "'(u)nsupported [sic] by competent, material, and substantial evi-
dence in view of the entire record as submitted.' "5 The court held that
"N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-315 (1964).
"In State ex rel. Util. Comm'n v. Ryder Tank Line, Inc., 259 N.C. 363, 130
S.E.2d 663 (1963), the court said that what constitutes public convenience and
necessity is primarily an administrative question, and the courts will not reverse the
exercise of discretionary power by an administrative agency except upon a showing
of capricious, unreasonable, or arbitrary action or disregard of law. The court
reviewed some of the testimony of witnesses showing the need for proposed service
and said, "The evidence of convenience and need is substantial." Id. at 367, 130
S.E.2d at 665. Obviously it was the substantial nature of the evidence that allowed
the agency's decision to clear the "arbitrary or capricious" hurdle.
" Jarrell v. Board of Adjustment, 258 N.C. 476, 128 S.E.2d 879 (1963).
11 Id. at 481, 128 S.E.2d at 883 (emphasis by the court).
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NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
the affidavit and letter were incompetent and that the board could not base
its finding on unsworn statements. 57
B. The Licensing Board Statute
Another exception set forth in the general judicial review statute to
the application of that statute is agencies "whose procedures are governed
by chapter 150 of the General Statutes ....," Chapter 150,"D like the
general judicial review statute, is a step in the direction of uniformity in
administrative law in North Carolina. The chapter applies to twenty-six
named administrative agencies licensing occupations."0 It is noticeable
that missing from the list are the North Carolina State Bar,"' the Board
of Medical Examiners of the State of North Carolina, 2 and the Board of
Pharmacy. 63
Chapter 150 provides a hearing to every licensee or applicant for a
license before denial of permission to take an examination, denial of a
license after an examination for any cause other than failure to pass,
withholding renewal of a license for cause other than failure to pay a
statutory renewal fee, or suspension or revocation of a license.
0 4
The hearings covered by chapter 150 would seem to be governed by
"' In another case, the State Board of Alcoholic Control suspended beer and wine
permits on the ground of sale of beer to a person under eighteen years of age. The
court quoted N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-315(5) (1964), and held that there was no
competent evidence that the purchaser was under eighteen. It said that testimony of
officers that the purchaser told them his birth date was properly excluded at the
hearing as hearsay and held that a certified copy of a birth certificate without
testimony that it was the birth certificate of the purchaser was incompetent to prove
the purchaser's age. Thomas v. State Bd. of Alcoholic Control, 258 N.C. 513, 128
S.E.2d 884 (1963).
In other beer permit suspension or revocation cases, the court has said the
Board's "findings are conclusive if supported by material and substantial evidence."
Freeman v. Board of Alcoholic Control, 264 N.C. 320, 323, 141 S.E.2d 499, 501
(1965), quoted in Keg, Inc. v. Board of Alcoholic Control, 277 N.C. 450, 456,
177 S.E.2d 861, 865 (1970). The court did not use the word "competent," but the
supporting evidence was clearly competent. Therefore, competence was not in
issue.
"N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-306(1) (1964).
" Chapter 150, which is N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 150-9 to -34 (1964), is discussed
in A Sirvey of Statutory Changes in North Carolina in 1953, 31 N.C.L. REv. 375,
378-81 (1953).
"oN.C. GEN. STAT. § 150-9 (Supp. 1969). The statute establishing the North
Carolina Licensing Board for Tile Contractors was held unconstitutional in Roller
v. Allen, 245 N.C. 516, 96 S.E.2d 851 (1957).
"
1See N.C. GEN. STAT. §84-15 (1965).
"See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-2 (1965).
8 See N.C. GEN. STAT. §90-55 (1965).
"N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150-10 (1964).
[Vol. 49
ADMINISTRATIVE EVIDENCE RULES
the 1967 Act since the "proceedings" governed by the latter are those
"wherein the legal rights, duties, or privileges of specific parties are
required by law . . . to be determined after an opportunity for agency
hearing."65
Provisions in Chapter 150 concerning admissibility of evidence before
the boards would therefore appear to be superseded by the 1967 Act.e6
The superseded provisions gave a person the right to present all
relevant evidence." It was further provided that the boards may admit
any evidence and "may give probative effect to evidence that is of a kind
commonly relied on by reasonably prudent men in the conduct of serious
affairs." However, the same section also recited, "Boards may in their
discretion exclude incompetent, irrelevant, immaterial, and unduly rep-
etitious evidence."6 The reader of Chapter 150 might well be puzzled by
the provision which gives a person the right to present all relevant evidence
when another provision gives the board the power to exclude at least some
of that evidence on named grounds.
The grounds in Chapter 150 for reversing or modifying a board's
decision on judicial review69 are practically the same as those in the
general judicial review statute already discussed. Before the 1967
Act Chapter 150 raised an additional problem. The reviewing court was
authorized to reverse or modify a board decision if it was unsupported
by competent evidence.7 But the boards were authorized to give pro-
bative effect to "evidence that is of a kind commonly relied on by reason-
ably prudent men in the conduct of serious affairs." It would seem that
this is what "competent" meant for the purpose of the board hearings.
Did it mean the same thing for the purposes of judicial review? That the
test should be the same7' is supportable because it would appear in-
congruous to provide that boards may give effect to evidence meeting the
"serious affairs" test and then provide that they may be reversed for
"N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-317(3) (Supp. 1969).
0 The 1967 Act contains the usual provision repealing all laws and clauses of
laws in conflict with the Act. Ch. 930, § 2, [1967] N.C. Sess. L. 1235. It contains
no provision repealing specified laws or clauses.
° N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150-15 (1964).06N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150-18 (1964).
"N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150-27 (1964).
"'N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150-27(5) (1964).
' Professor Stansbury thought so. After quoting the "serious affairs" test,
he wrote, "Competency should, however, be judged by the statute and not by
the common-law evidence rules." STANsBTRY § 4, at n.29. The same view is taken
in A Survey of Statutory Changes in North Carolihw in 1953, 31 N.C.L. REv. 375,
380 (1953).
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basing a decision on it. However, an argument the other way can be
founded on the fact that the general judicial review statute includes an
identical ground for reversal and this latter provision is unaccompanied
by anything in the statute indicating any meaning of "competent" other
than the usual one. It can be argued that identical provisions are intended
to have identical effects. 2
It may be that the legislature in using the word "competent" in these
and other North Carolina statutes did so without having in mind that
this could mean a requirement of evidence meeting the jury-trial rules,
"Competent" has a lawyer-like ring; it sounds good; who would favor
incompetent evidence?
For the purposes of the licensing board statute, this problem concerning
the meaning of "competent" in the judicial review section of that statute
disappears if the 1967 Act applies because evidence not meeting the jury-
trial test of competence would not be admissible before the licensing boards
in the first place. However, the previous possibility of the "serious affairs"
requirement being the test of what is "competent" illustrates that the mean-
ing of that word may vary with its statutory setting.
C. The Public Utilities Act
One of the most important administrative agencies of the state is the
North Carolina Utilities Commission. It is expressly excluded from the
coverage of the 1967 Act." The provisions of the statute governing
evidence before the Commission contrast sharply with those in the licensing
board statute. The licensing boards, prior to the 1967 Act, could admit
"any evidence"; the Utilities Commission, when acting as a court of
record,7' "shall apply the rules of evidence applicable in civil actions in
the superior court, insofar as practicable."75 While the licensing boards
could give probative effect to evidence meeting the "serious affairs" test,
72 The writer has found no North Carolina cases applying the evidence provisions
of the licensing board statute except one holding that where the North Carolina
State Board of Opticians revoked an optician's license, its findings were conclusive
on the reviewing court under N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150-27 (1964), because they were
supported by "competent, material, and substantial evidence." No light was shed
on the meaning of "competent." In re Berman, 245 N.C. 612, 97 S.E.2d 232
(1957).
'7'N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-317(1) (Supp. 1969).
'7'N.C. GEN. STAT. § 62-60 (1965), indicates that the Commission is so acting
when conducting hearings, making decisions, and issuing orders.
"'N.C. GEN. STAT. § 62-65(a) (1965). Subsection (a) also provides, "The
Commission may exclude incompetent, irrelevant, immaterial and unduly repetitious
or cumulative evidence."
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the Public Utilities Act provides, "[N]o decision or order of the Com-
mission shall be made . . .unless the same is supported by competent
material and substantial evidence upon consideration of the whole
record."7
6
The Public Utilities Act provisions authorizing the court on judicial
review to reverse or modify a decision of the Commission77 follow almost
verbatim the parallel provisions of the general judicial review statute and
the licensing board statute. However, the utilities statute adds that due
account shall be taken of the rule of prejudicial error,78 and the determina-
tion of the Commission is made prima facie just and reasonable. 9
The question may be raised whether the Commission would be re-
versed if it failed to apply the "rules of evidence applicable in civil actions
in the superior court, insofar as practicable." There are general state-
ments by the North Carolina Supreme Court which, along with the rule
of prejudicial error, could be invoked if such a case arises. The court has
said, "Ordinarily, the procedure before the Commission is more or less
informal, and is not as strict as in superior court, nor is it confined by
technical rules; substance and not form is controlling.
80
The quoted statement was not made in connection with evidence before
the Commission; however, in a case involving evidence received by the
Commission after its hearing, the court noted the above statutory require-
ment that the Commission apply the rules of evidence and added, "The
procedure before the Commission is, however, not as formal as that in lit-
igation conducted in the superior court."'" The court approved the receipt
"N.C. GEN. STAT. § 62-65(a) (1965).
"
7N.C. GEN. STAT. § 62-94(b) (Supp. 1969).
"N.C. GEN. STAT. § 62-94(c) (Supp. 1969). This provision was applied in
State ex ret. Util. Comm'n v. Nello L. Teer Co., 266 N.C. 366, 146 S.E.2d 511
(1966).
"'N.C. GEN. STAT. § 62-94(e) (Supp. 1969). This provision does not prevent
the utility from showing on appeal that the findings of the Commission are un-
supported by competent, material, and substantial evidence. State ex rel. Util.
Comm'n v. Carolina Coach Co., 261 N.C. 384, 134 S.E.2d 689 (1964) ; State ex rel.
Util. Comm'n v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 233 N.C. 365, 64 S.E.2d 272 (1951).
In State ex rel. Util. Comm'n v. Ray, 236 N.C. 692, 73 S.E.2d 870 (1953), the
court pointed out that the statute made the Commission's determination prima facie
just and reasonable, rehearsed some of the evidence, and found that the presump-
tion had not been overcome.
'0 State ex rel. Util. Comm'n v. Carolinas Comm. for Indus. Power Rates &
Area Dev., Inc., 257 N.C. 560, 569, 126 S.E.2d 325, 332 (1962), quoted in State
ex rel. Util. Comm'n v. Western Carolina Tel. Co., 260 N.C. 369, 375, 132 S.E.2d
873, 877 (1963).
"' State ex rel. Util. Comm'n v. Carolina Tel. & Tel. Co., 267 N.C. 257, 269, 148
S.E.2d 100, 109 (1966).
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of the evidence in the case but said that the adverse party would have had
the right to demand that the hearing be reopened.
In cases in which the Supreme Court of North Carolina finds evidence
supporting the Commission's decision or finds such evidence lacking, it is
likely to state that there was or was not competent, material, and sub-
stantial evidence to support the Commission even if there is no issue as to
the competent nature of some particular evidence.8 2 In a case83 involving
the Commission's denial of a railroad's application to consolidate two
agency stations, the court cited the statutory provision requiring that no
decision of the Commission be made unless supported by competent, mater-
ial, and substantial evidence upon the whole record and the parallel pro-
vision concerning judicial review. The court rehearsed evidence showing
the small amount of shipments to and from the stations, and it held that
the Commission's findings and conclusions that a full time agent was needed
to meet the public convenience and necessity at one of the stations and that
public convenience and necessity at the other could not be met under the
railroad's proposed plan were not supported by the evidence. The case,
however, did not involve the competency of the particular evidence; father
it involved what the evidence did or did not prove."4
Admissibility of evidence, however, was involved in a case concerning
increased rates allowed by the Commission to an electric company.
The Commission refused to admit evidence of the rates of another
company in the area when no evidence of relative cost conditions to the
two companies was offered, and the supreme court sustained the Com-
mission."' This holding amounts to no more than a determination that
the item of evidence was incomplete, and, therefore, irrelevant.
The Commission is authorized by statute to "make and promulgate
rules of practice and procedure for the Commission hearings."8 0 The
Commission has made a rule providing, "Any evidence admissible under
the General Statutes of North Carolina, or under the rules of evidence
applicable in civil actions in the superior court of this State, will be
82 State ex rel. Util. Comm'n v. Carolina Coach Co., 261 N.C. 384, 134 S.E.2d
689 (1964) ; State ex rel. Util. Comm'n v. Carolinas Comm. for Indus. Power Rates
& Area Dev., Inc., 257 N.C. 560, 126 S.E.2d 325 (1962).
" State ex rel. Util. Comm'n v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 268 N.C. 242, 150
S.E.2d 386 (1966).
"The latter statement is true also of State ex rel. Util. Comm'n v. Nello L.
Teer Co., 266 N.C. 366, 146 S.E.2d 511 (1966).
8 State ex rel. Util. Comm'n v. Municipal Corps., 243 N.C. 193, 90 S.E.2d 519
(1955).
"' N.C. GEN. STAT. § 62-72 (1965).
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admissible in investigations and hearings before the Commission."87 This
is a rephrasing of the governing statutory provision and indicates the
Commission's disposition to follow the rules of evidence. The Commis-
sion has particularized the general provision in an excellent rule stating,
"Letters, telegrams and petitions sent to the Commission concerning
matters pending before it for hearing violate the rules of evidence, and
sending such communications to the Commission, or inducing others to
do so, will not be looked upon with favor by the Commission."'88
D. The Workmen's Compensation Act
The Industrial Commission is also excluded from the coverage of the
1967 Act. The statutory provisions concerning evidence before the In-
dustrial Commission under the Workmen's Compensation Act 9 differ
widely from those relating to evidence before the Utilities Commission.
The Workmen's Compensation Act provides, "Processes and procedure
under this article shall be as summary and simple as reasonably may
be."9" The Commission, any of its members, or a deputy, "shall hear the
parties at issue ... and shall determine the dispute in a summary man-
ner."91 A variation appears concerning asbestosis or silicosis cases, in
which the provision for the final hearing states, "[T]he Industrial Com-
mission ... shall receive all competent evidence bearing on the cause."912
The Act also provides, "The Commission may make rules.., for carrying
out the provisions of this article."9 3
In contrast with the extensive powers of judicial review elaborated in
the general judicial review statute, the licensing board statute, and the
Public Utilities Act, the Workmen's Compensation Act provides, "The
award of the Industrial Commission . . . shall be conclusive and binding
as to all questions of fact; but either party to the dispute may ... appeal
from the decision of said Commission to the Court of Appeals for errors
of law . ... "I'
Although this judicial review provision does not mention review of
87 RULES AND REGULATIONS OF TIIE NoRTi CAROLINA UTILITIES COMMISSION,
Rule R1-24(a) (1970).88Id. Rule R1-24(i).
0N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 97-1 to -101 (1965).
0 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-80(a) (1965).
"N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-84 (1965).
" N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-61.6 (Supp. 1969).
"N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-80(a) (1965).
"'N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-86 (Supp. 1969). Formerly the appeal was to the
superior court. Ch. 120, § 60, [1929] 'N.C. Sess. L. 140.
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the evidence before the Commission, such review power is found in review
for errors of law. The court on appeal may review the evidence to deter-
mine as a matter of law whether there is any evidence to support the
Commission's findings. 5 The evidence required must be legally com-
petent. In one case, evidence of statements by an employee who later died
of an injury that he received the injury while caddying (his employment)
was held insufficient. Moreover, the court stated flatly, "That hearsay
evidence is not admissible and has no probative force in the proof of an
essential fact at issue is so well established that we need not discuss the
same or cite authorities in support thereof.""0
Hearsay was thus declared to be inadmissible, but an award has been
held valid even though hearsay was admitted where there was competent
evidence to support the award.9 7 The court in that case noted that the
Act empowered the Commission to make rules for carrying out the
provisions of the Act, that the Act required processes and procedure to be
summary and simple, and that it provided that the dispute was to be de-
termined in a summary manner. From these provisions the court con-
cluded that a liberal treatment by the courts of the procedure adopted
by the Commission with respect to the reception and consideration of
evidence was intended. The court also indicated that the hearsay in the
case was acceptable in corroboration or explanation of the circumstantial
evidence.
In numerous other cases the court has held that findings of the Com-
mission supported by competent evidence are conclusive on appeal."8 This
95Vause v. Vause Farm Equip. Co., 233 N.C. 88, 63 S.E.2d 173 (1951). In
many cases the court states that on judicial review two questions of law for the
court are the following: First, whether there was any competent evidence to sup-
port the Commission's findings of fact, and, second, whether the facts found were
sufficient to support the Commission's conclusions and decision. Byers v. North
Carolina State Highway Comm'n, 275 N.C. 229, 233, 166 S.E.2d 649, 651-52
(1969) ; Moore v. Adams Elec. Co., 259 N.C. 735, 736, 131 S.E.2d 356, 357 (1963) ;
Thomason v. Red Bird Cab Co., 235 N.C. 602, 605, 70 S.E.2d 706, 708 (1952);
Henry v. A.C. Lawrence Leather Co., 231 N.C. 477, 479, 57 S.E.2d 760, 762
(1950).
'
8 Plyler v. Charlotte Country Club, 214 N.C. 453, 456, 199 S.E. 622, 623
(1938). In Brown v. Asheville Ice Co., 203 N.C. 97, 164 S.E. 631 (1932), the court
held that hearsay in the form of evidence of declarations by the employee before
his death as to the manner of his injury was incompetent and furnished no basis
for setting aside the Commission's order denying compensation.7 Maley v. Thomasville Furniture Co., 214 N.C. 589, 200 S.E. 438 (1939). The
court also pointed out that timely objection to the hearsay had not been made.
"
8 E.g., Hollman v. City of Raleigh, 273 N.C. 240, 159 S.E.2d 874 (1968);
Anderson v. Lincoln Constr. Co., 265 N.C. 431, 144 S.E.2d 272 (1965); Byrd v.
Farmers Fed'n Cooperative,.260 N.C. 215, 132 S.E.2d 348 (1963). , -
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follows even though incompetent evidence was admitted 0 Conversely,
the court holds that where the findings are based on incompetent evidence,
they must be set aside.Y°
E. The Employment Security Law
A third state agency expressly excluded from the coverage of the 1967
Act is the Employment Security Commission. 10 ' The provisions for ev-
idence before the Commission and for judicial review not only vary from
those of the statutes considered above, but they vary for different pro-
ceedings within the agency itself. The Employment Security Law provides,
"The Commission shall not be bound by common-law or statutory rules
of evidence ... but shall conduct hearings in such manner as to ascertain
the substantial rights of the parties."'0 2 Conduct of hearings "shall be
governed by suitable rules and regulations established by the Com-
mission."'0 3 The Commission is further empowered to make rules "as
it deems necessary or suitable in the administration of this chapter....
The Commission shall determine its own .. .methods of procedure in
"'104accordance with the provisions of this chapter ....
Under subsection 96-4(m) of the statute, the Commission has power
to conduct hearings for determining the rights, status, and liabilities of
employers, including determining the amount of contributions due. Appeal
is provided to the superior court. When exceptions are made to facts
found by the Commission, "[t] he decision or determination of the Com-
mission upon such review in the superior court shall be conclusive and
binding as to all questions of fact supported by any competent evidence."'10 5
However, it is provided by subsection 96-4(r) that claims for benefits
shall be prosecuted and determined as provided in section 96-15, which
states, "[T]he conduct of hearings and appeals [within the agency] shall
be in accordance with rules prescribed by the Commission for determining
the rights of the parties, whether or not such rules conform to common-law
" Blalock v. City of Durham, 244 N.C. 208, 92 S.E.2d 758 (1956); Carlton v.
Bernhardt-Seagle Co., 210 N.C. 655, 188 S.E. 77 (1936).
100 Citizens Bank & Trust Co. v. Reid Motor Co., 216 N.C. 432, 5 S.E.2d 318
(1939). The incompetent evidence was testimony of a witness, who refused to
submit to cross-examination, and testimony from a criminal trial. The court said
the evidence should have been excluded.
'o' See N.C. GEm. STAT. §§ 96-1 to -27 (1965).
10 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 96 4 (p) (1965).
103 Id.
O'0 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 964(a) (1965).
... N.C. GEN. STAT. § 96-4(m) (1965) (emphasis added).
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or statutory rules of evidence and other technical rules of procedure."'100
It is noticeable that the terminology in the provision concerning evidence
before the Commission in hearings on claims for benefits varies markedly
from the language of the provisions quoted above concerning hearings
before the Commission generally. If the substance is intended to be the
same, it is not apparent why the words should be different.
Subsection 96-15 (i) governing claims for benefits provides for appeal
to the superior court in which court, "[t]he findings of the Commis-
sion as to the facts, if there is evidence to support it . . . shall be con-
clusive. ... -107 Why the one judicial review provision should make the
findings conclusive if supported by any competest evidence and the other
if supported by evidence is hard to see.
In a considerable number of cases, the North Carolina Supreme
Court has cited subsection 964(m) as making the decision or determina-
tion by the Commission conclusive on appeal as to all questions of fact
supported by any competent evidence, and the supreme court has found
in some of these cases that there was' 08 such competent evidence, while
in one case, there was not 9 competent evidence. However, in none of
these cases cited was there a question before the court of the competency
of any particular item of evidence, nor as to the amount of the evidence.
Accordingly, no light was shed on whether literally any competent ev-
idence, no matter how little, supporting the findings would make them
conclusive on appeal. Furthermore, if supported by competent evidence,
the findings are conclusive on appeal although there is evidence the other
way.".
0
Oddly enough, the court has cited subsection 96-4(m) in benefit claims
cases"' notwithstanding the provision of subsection 96-4(r) that claims
"'N.C. GEN. STAT. § 96-15(f) (1965).
"'N.C. GEN. STAT. §96-15(i) (Supp. 1969) (emphasis added).
.0. State ex- rel. Employment Sec. Comm'n v. Coe, 239 N.C. 84, 79 S.E.2d 177
(1953) ; State ex rel. Employment Sec. Comm'n v. Monsees, 234 N.C. 69, 65 S.E.2d
887 (1951); State ex rel. Employment Sec. Comm'n v. Kermon, 232 N.C. 342,
60 S.E.2d 580 (1950); State ex ret. Employment Sec. Comm'n v. Champion Dis-
trib. Co., 230 N.C. 464, 53 S.E.2d 674 (1949).
... State ex rel. Employment Sec. Comm'n v. Hennis Freight Lines, Inc., 248
N.C. 496, 103 S.E.2d 829 (1958). The court held that a finding of the Commission
was not supported by competent evidence, but the court did not recite any evidence
supporting such finding. Apparently the finding was contrary to the terms of a
controlling lease agreement.
State ex rel. Unemployment Compensation Comm'n v. J.M. Willis Barber &
Beauty Shop, 219 N.C. 709, 15 S.E.2d 4 (1941).
In re Stutts, 245 N.C. 405, 95 S.E.2d 919 (1957) ; State ex rel. Employment
Sec. Conun'n v. Smith, 235 N.C. 104, 69 S.E.2d 32 (1952).
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for benefits shall be prosecuted and determined as provided in section
96-15. Furthermore, in a benefit claims case, the court has said that if
findings are supported by competent evidence, they are conclusive and
cited subsection 96-15 (i) in support of the statement." 2 As noted above,
that subsection specifies "evidence" and does not say "competent ev-
idence." In another benefit claims case,"" the court recited that findings
of fact were made conclusive when supported by "any" evidence and
cited subsection 96-15(i). The word "any" does not appear in that
subsection, though it does in subsection 96-4(m). Further, the court cited
among cases giving effect to subsection 96-15 (i) a case" 4 in which the
court actually applied subsection 96-4(m) though it was a benefit claims
case.
The writer concludes that the court does not distinguish between the
provision specifying "any competent evidence" and that specifying "ev-
idence."
In other benefit claims cases, the court has cited and applied the pro-
vision that findings of the Commission are conclusive if there is evidence
to support them without, however, having any question before it as to
whether incompetent evidence would qualify as evidence. In each case
the court said the evidence was "ample." 1 5
F. Some Licensing Agencies Not Included in the Licensing Board Statute
1. The North Carolina State Bar
The council of the North Carolina State Bar elects the Board of Law
Examiners, which is authorized to examine applicants and provide rules
and regulations for admission to the bar."" In a case" 7 in which that
" In re Abernathy, 259 N.C. 190, 194-95, 130 S.E.2d 292, 296 (1963). On the
other hand, in State ex rel. Employment Sec. Comm'n v. Jarrell, 231 N.C. 381, 384,
57 S.E.2d 403, 405 (1950), a claims case, the court said the function of the review-
ing court is ordinarily, "(1) To determine whether there was evidence before the
Commission to support its findings of fact; and (2) to decide whether the facts
found sustain the conclusions of law and the resultant decision of the Commission"
(emphasis added). The court held that the facts found did not support the Com-
mission's conclusion of law and resultant decision.
.. In re Southern, 247 N.C. 544, 547, 101 S.E.2d 327, 329 (1958).
... State ex rel. Employment Sec. Comm'n v. Roberts, 230 N.C. 262, 52 S.E.2d
890 (1949).
...In re Stevenson, 237 N.C. 528, 75 S.E.2d 520 (1953); State ex ret. Un-
employment Compensation Comm'n v. Martin, 228 N.C. 277, 45 S.E.2d 385 (1947).
116 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 84-24 (Supp. 1969). The section does not prescribe the
kind of evidence the Board is to receive, but RULES OF THE BoARD OF LAW EXAM-
INERS OF NoRTH CAROLINA, Rule VIII, § 5 (1970), provides, "All investigations in
reference to the moral character of an applicant may be informal, but shall be
thorough, with the object of ascertaining the truth. Neither the hearsay rule, nor
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Board had denied an applicant permission to take the bar examination
based on a finding of fact that the applicant had not been a citizen and
resident of North Carolina for twelve months next preceding the filing
of the application, the court held that there was "sufficient competent
evidence"'18 to support the finding and that the administrative decision
was conclusive as to properly supported findings of fact. There was no
question raised as to the competent character of any of the evidence.
The council of the North Carolina State Bar or any committee of its
members appointed for the purpose of hearing charges or so designated by
the supreme court has jurisdiction to hear charges of malpractice, corrupt
or unprofessional conduct, or violation of professional ethics made against
any member of the bar."-9 The person charged may demand a trial in
the superior court or by committee. 20 Trials by committee "shall conform
as nearly as practicable to the procedure provided by law before referees
in references by consent with the right to appeal to the superior court ......
Proceedings in the superior court shall thereafter be conducted in accor-
dance with the laws and rules relating to consent references in civil
actions.-
2
'
Since the proceedings in the superior court on appeal are conducted
in accordance with the rules relating to consent references, the judge may
"'affirm, amend, modify, set aside, make additional findings .... It is
the duty of the judge to consider the evidence and give his own opinion
and conclusion, both upon the facts and the law.' "122
any other technical rule of evidence need be observed." Whether the 1967 Act dis-
places this provision would seem to depend on whether the North Carolina State
Bar is excepted from the 1967 Act as an agency in the judicial department (see note
126 infra) and on whether the applicant is entitled to a hearing before denial of
permission to take the bar examination (right to a hearing is a requisite to a pro-
ceeding covered by the 1967 Act). That there is the right to a hearing is brought
out in Note, Admission to the Bar---"Good Moral Character"-Con.stitutional Pro-
tections, 45 N.C.L. Rav. 1008, 1014 (1967).
"' Baker v. Varser, 240 N.C. 260, 82 S.E.2d 90 (1954).
Id. at 269, 82 S.E.2d at 97.
"
9 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 84-28(1) (1965).
'N.C. GEN. STAT. § 84-28(3)d. (Supp. 1969).
"
2 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 84-28(3)f. (Supp. 1969). Reference is now governed by
N.C.R. Civ. P. 53. The judge after a hearing may adopt, modify, or reject the
report of the referee. N.C.R. Civ. P. 53(g) (2).
... North Carolina State Bar v. Frazier, 269 N.C. 625, 634, 153 S.E.2d 367, 373
(1967). The court quoted from Anderson v. McRae, 211 N.C. 197, 198-99, 189
S.E. 639, 640 (1937). The statements made in Anderson were applicable to in-
stances wherein exceptions were filed to the referee's report. The courts state-
ment seems compatible with N.C.R. Civ. P. 53(g) (2). However, that rule does
not expressly make it the duty of the judge to give his own opinion and conclusion
on facts and law. But cf. N.C.R. Civ. P. 52(a) (1).
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The superior court, in a consent reference case, affirmed some of the
referee's findings but disapproved others and made substitute findings.
The supreme court held that there was nevertheless sufficient competent
evidence to support the material findings of the referee and the superior
court and affirmed the judgment.Y23
One final point should be noted: The North Carolina State Bar stat-
utory provisions2 4 make no requirement for exclusion by a trial committee
of incompetent and hearsay evidence; 25 therefore, the 1967 Act in its
terms imposes this further requirement, assuming the North Carolina
State Bar and its agencies are not excepted from the 1967 Act as agencies
in the judicial department.2"
2. The Board of Medical Examiners of the State of North Carolina
A provision of the statute concerning licenses to practice medicine,
obviously applicable to denial of license proceedings as well as suspension
or revocation proceedings, reads, "In proceedings held pursuant to this
article the Board [of Medical Examiners of the State of North Carolina]
shall admit and hear evidence in the same manner and form as prescribed
by law for civil actions."' T It is noteworthy that this provision governs
what evidence is admissible and that it goes far in the direction of the 1967
Act. In a case in which the Board had revoked a license to practice med-
icine, the supreme court quoted this statutory provision and held that no
evidence had been received contrary to its provisions. The court held that
examination of the physician as to the previous misconduct was competent
for purposes of impeachment. 2 '
In the case of denial of a license for cause other than failure to pass
an examination, appeal to the superior court is provided. Upon such
"'Holder v. Home Mortgage Co., 214 N.C. 128, 198 S.E. 589 (1938). The
case involved a reference in an action to restrain a sale of real estate under a
deed of trust.
"'N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 84-15 to -38 (1965).
.2 The council of the North Carolina State Bar and trial committees may
formulate rules of procedure governing trials. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 84-28(3)
(Supp. 1969). A rule governing trial by committee provides in part, "[R]e-
spondent shall have the right to produce in his behalf all competent evidence...."
THE NORTH CAROLINA STATE BAR, STATUTES, RULES AND REGULATIONS, CANONS
oF ETHIcs AND OPINIONS Part V, art. IX, § 2(h) (Melott ed. 1970) (emphasis
added). This does not say that incompetent evidence shall be excluded.
' The North Carolina State Bar and its agencies are created by statute and are
not provided for by article IV of the North Carolina Constitution (Judicial Depart-
ment).
"'I N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-14.6 (1965).
.. ith re Kincheloe, 272 N.C. 116, 157 S.E.2d 833 (1967).
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appeal, "The decision of the Board shall be upheld unless the substantial
rights of the applicant have been prejudiced because the decision of
the Board . . . is not supported by any evidence admissible under this
article . ,,.*."' It is to be noted that this provision embodies the rule
of "prejudicial error"; that the kind of evidence required to support the
Board's decision and the kind which is admissible are the same; and that
in the literal language of the provision, "any" evidence of the kind
required will be sufficient.
Appeal to the superior court is also provided in license suspension and
revocation cases. The court may "reverse or modify the decision if the
substantial rights of the accused physician have been prejudiced because
the findings or decisions of the Board... are not supported by competent,
material, and substantial evidence admissible under this article."'3 10 The
provision resembles that governing appeal in license denial cases, but
whereas the latter specifies "any" evidence of the required kind as the
test for the validity of the Board's decision, the former specifies "com-
petent, material, and substantial" evidence of the required kind as the
test. Whether the difference in language will produce differences in result
is doubtful. The reason for variation in language of the two appeal pro-
visions is not apparent.
3. The Board of Pharmacy
The statute'3 1 governing the Board of Pharmacy is a good example
of a statute governing a licensing agency of the state but which statute
makes no provision for the kind of evidence controlling license denial or
revocation proceedings and also no provision for judicial review of the
Board decisions. The Board may, after notice and hearing, refuse to
grant any license, or it may suspend, revoke, or refuse to renew any license
issued by it to any pharmacist or assistant pharmacist for causes stated,
and it may take like action on the same grounds as to any permits for
the operation of a drugstore or pharmacy. 3 2 Although the statute makes
no provision concerning the evidence upon which the Board is to act,
the Board has power to adopt rules for the regulation of its proceedings.' 3
129 N.C. GEr. STAT. § 90-14.1 (1965).
"'°N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-14.10 (1965). The supreme court has quoted the
statute and held upon consideration of all the evidence that it was sufficient to
sustain the findings of the Board. In re Kincheloe, 272 N.C. 116, 157 S.E.2d 833
(1967).
..
1N.C. GEr. STAT. §§ 90-53 to -85.1 (1965).8 N.C. GEv. STAT. § 90-65 (Supp. 1969).
"8 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-57 (1965).
[Vol. 49
ADMINISTRATIVE EVIDENCE RULES
But the writer was told by the Secretary-Treasurer of the Board that the
Board has made no rules concerning evidence in its hearings and that its
hearings are informal. Since notice and hearing are required before the
Board may refuse to grant, or suspend, etc., a license or permit, the 1967
Act appears to be clearly applicable.' Likewise, since no provision is
made for judicial review of these Board actions, the general judicial review
statute applies.
3 5
III. ASPECTS OF EVIDENCE BEFORE ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES
At this point some important particular aspects of evidence before
administrative agencies adjudicating cases will be discussed from the stand-
point of the law generally, without confining the discussion to particular
North Carolina statutes.
A. Admissibility
With regard to whether it is reversible error for an administrative
agency to admit incompetent evidence, including hearsay inadmissible in
a jury trial, the matter is resolved when the statute, as in the case of a
provision relating to the Employment Security Commission, expressly
states that the administrative agency "shall not be bound by common-law
or statutory rules of evidence."' 6 In the absence of a controlling statutory
provision, the law generally and in North Carolina apart from the 1967
Act is that judicial enforcement of evidence rules is relaxed in cases in-
volving administrative proceedings. The Supreme Court of the United
States has said, "[I]t has long been settled that the technical rules for the
exclusion of evidence applicable in jury trials do not apply to proceedings
before federal administrative agencies in the absence of a statutory require-
ment that such rules are to be observed."' 3 7 According to Professor Davis,
in state court cases in which hearsay or other incompetent evidence has
been admitted by an administrative agency, even when done over objec-
tion, the court usually invokes the rule that admission of incompetent
evidence is no ground for reversal of an order supported by competent
evidence. "This result is common whatever the applicable statute may say
about admission of or reliance upon incompetent evidence.""'
"N.C. GEN. STAT. §143-317(3-) (Supp. 1969).
"
8
"N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-306(1) (1964).
..
0 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 96-4(p) (1965).
.. Opp Cotton Mills, Inc. v. Administrator of the Wage & Hour Div. of The
Dep't of Labor, 312 U.S. 126, 155 (1941).
.. 2 DAvis § 14.08.
1971]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
It is itrue that in a workmen's compensation case in North Carolina
the supreme court, despite a provision that such disputes shall be deter-
mined in a summary manner, 39 stated flatly that hearsay is not ad-
missible.14 But the ground for invalidating the Commission's award
was lack of competent evidence to support its findings, not admission of
the incompetent evidence. Moreover, in a case decided the next year, the
court considered the applicable statutory provisions and concluded that a
liberal treatment by the courts of the Commission's procedure with regard
to reception and consideration of evidence was intended. 41
There are North Carolina cases indicating that incompetent evidence
should have been excluded by the Industrial Commission, 42 or was prop-
erly excluded, 48 but these fall short of holdings reversing the Commission
for admitting incompetent evidence. Conversely, an administrative agency
cannot exclude relevant competent evidence. Further, the agency must con-
sider such evidence. 44
With reference to administrative agencies generally, the supreme
court, in refusing to find invalid a suspension of a license to sell beer
where incompetent evidence was received, has said, "[T]he rules of
evidence before administrative boards permit more latitude than is cus-
tomary in court proceedings."' 45 Even in the case of the Utilities Com-
mission, which is required by statute to apply the rules of evidence
applicable in civil actions so far as practicable, 4 ' the court has said that
the procedure before the Commission is not as strict as in superior court,
nor is it confined by technical rules. 47
Further, the rule of prejudicial error must be taken into account; the
139N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-84 (1965).1
~oPlyler v. Charlotte Country Club, 214 N.C. 453, 456, 199 S.E. 622, 62a (1938).
Maley v. Thomasville Furniture Co., 214 N.C. 589, 200 S.E. 438 (1939).
12 Hildebrand v. McDowell Furniture Co., 212 N.C. 100, 110, 193 S.E. 294, 301
(1937) ; material cited note 100 supra. In West v. North Carolina Dep't of Con-
servation & Dev., 229 N.C. 232, 49 S.E.2d 398 (1948), a witness had testified to a
statement by an employee later deceased. The court said the statement was in-
admissible but indicated it would not have been sufficient to show accident in any
event
148 Little v. Power Brake Co., 255 N.C. 451, 456-57, 121 S.E.2d 889, 892-93
(1961).
..In re Filing by N.C. Fire Ins. Rating Bureau, 275 N.C. 15, 37, 165 S.E.2d
207, 222 (1969).
"' Campbell v. North Carolina State Bd. of Alcoholic Control, 263 N.C. 224,
225, 139 S.E.2d 197, 198 (1964). The court has held, however, that in a beer and
wine permit suspension hearing, hearsay was properly excluded, Note 57 supra.
'"N.C. GEN. STAT. § 62-65(a) (1965).
147 Note 80 supra.
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court has held that the introduction of incompetent evidence cannot be
held prejudicial where there is competent evidence to support the find-
ings.14
8
B. Use of Material Outside the Record
Administrative agencies, as distinguished from courts, are specialized
and commonly expert, and the more important ones ordinarily have staffs
of specialists such as accountants and engineers. The agencies often have
authority to require reports from the regulated enterprises and in this
and other ways accumulate extensive data in their files. A major problem
is the extent to which the agencies in adjudicating cases may make use
of their own expert knowledge, their staffs, and their accumulated data.
The question may arise after a hearing officer has heard a case and finds
he needs further information. May he resort to experts on the staff and
to the agency's files? The same question may face the agency itself when
the trial officer has made an initial or recommended decision that is
before the agency for review.
The Supreme Court, in a case in which a finding of the Interstate
Commerce Commission rested in part on statistical data taken from annual
reports filed with the Commission but not put in evidence, held that this
constituted error and said that nothing can be treated as evidence which
is not introduced as such. The objection to the use of such data is not
lack of authenticity or trustworthiness but lack of notice to the affected
parties of the evidence with which they are confronted.149
The Supreme Court of North Carolina has taken the same position.
Recourse may not be had to records, files, evidence, or data not admitted,
agreed, stipulated, or offered in open hearing.' 50 The expert knowledge
of the Utilities Commission cannot be considered on appeal unless the
facts within that knowledge are on the record.'
The expert knowledge of the administrative agency may, however, be
... Campbell v. North Carolina State Bd. of Alcoholic Control, 263 N.C. 224,
139 S.E.2d 197 (1964); Blalock v. City of Durham, 244 N.C. 208, 92 S.E.2d 758
(1956).
"' United States v. Abilene & S. Ry., 265 U.S. 274 (1924). The Court's
position is criticized in 2 DAvis § 15.10.
"' Letterlough v. Atkins, 258 N.C. 166, 169, 128 S.E.2d 215, 217-18 (1962);
Biddix v. Rex Mills, Inc., 237 N.C. 660, 663, 75 S.E.2d 777, 780 (1953). "[T]he
Commission erred in basing its decision on information it says its files do or do not
disclose." Id.
'51 State ex rel. Util. Comm'n v. Carolina Coach Co., 261 N.C. 384, 134 S.E.2d
689 (1964).
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used in evaluating evidence. 52 Indeed a truly expert agency, saturated
with knowledge on a subject, could not, even if it wanted to do so, weigh
evidence within the scope of the subject in ignorance.
C. Official Notice
An exception to. the rule that evidence must be introduced as such
is official notice. Agencies may take official notice of matters of which
courts take judicial notice.Y53 In addition,
The rule is now clearly emerging that an administrative agency
may take official notice of any generally recognized technical or scientific
facts within the agency's specialized knowledge, subject always to the
proviso that the parties must be given adequate advance notice of the
facts which the agency proposes to note, and given adequate opportunity
to show the inaccuracy of the facts or the fallacy of the conclusions
which the agency proposes tentatively to accept without proof.154
Statutory provisions on official notice are numerous. The Revised
Model State Administrative Procedure Act subsection 10(4) provides:
[N]otice may be taken of generally recognized technical or scientific
facts within the agency's specialized knowledge. Parties shall be notified
either before or during the hearing, or by reference in preliminary
reports or otherwise, of the material noticed, including any staff memo-
randa or data, and they shall be afforded an opportunity to contest the
material so noticed.
The 1967 Act follows this provision on official notice verbatim.'55
The quoted provision from the Revised Model Act and the 1967 Act
appears to have an ambiguity. It authorizes notice of generally recognized
technical or scientific facts. But procedurally the parties are to be notified
of material noticed, including staff memoranda or data. Does the latter
'"" The 1967 Act provides that an administrative agency's experience, technical
competence, and specialized knowledge may be used in the evaluation of the evidence.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-318(3) (Supp. 1969). A comparable view is expressed by
Hanft, Utilities Commissions as Expert Courts, 15 N.C.L. REv. 12, 21-24 (1936).
The 1967 Act provision is the same as that in REVISE MODEL STATE ADMIN-
ISTRATIVE PROCEDuRE ACT § 10(4) (1961). Professor Davis makes the practical
point that the provision should include the experience, technical competence, and
specialized knowledge of the agency's staff as well as that of the agency. K. DAVIS,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, CASES-TEXT-PROBLEMS 586 (1965).
..1 COOPER 412; REVISED MODEL STATE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT
§ 10(4) (1961); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-318(3) (Supp. 1969).
... 1 COOPER 412-13. Official notice is discussed in 2 DAVIS §§ 15.01-.14; Hanft,
Utilities Commissions as Expert Courts, 15 N.C.L. REV. 12, 28-37 (1936).
"' N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-318(3) (Supp. 1969).
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provision expand what may be officially noticed? That would seem de-
sirable. If procedural safeguards to the parties are afforded, there is. no
apparent reason why the knowledge and accumulated data of the agency
should not be resorted to by the agency.
Professor Davis criticizes the Model Act provision and argues that
a distinction should be made between adjudicative facts, which are facts
having to do with the parties, and legislative facts, which are those pertain-
ing to law or policy. He suggests different procedures for affording the
parties opportunity to contest the different types of facts noticed. 5'
Included in possible procedures to afford affected parties an oppor-
tunity to contest facts officially noticed are the following: continuation or
reopening of the hearing; or if the hearing is before a trial officer, notation
in his initial or recommended decision of the evidence noticed so that it
can be contested before the agency itself or notation in the agency's de-
cision of the evidence noticed with opportunity for the parties to request
a reopening. Professor Davis holds that where the facts are adjudicative
(as distinguished from legislative), disputed, and critical, they should
be put in evidence subject to cross-examination and rebuttal.' 57
In North Carolina, a statutory treatment of official notice by a par-
ticular administrative agency is found in the Public Utilities Act. The
Act provides that all evidence, including records and documents in the
possession of the Public Utilities Commission, of which it desires to avail
itself shall be made part of the record by reference thereto at the hearing. 58
Most of the data and documents in the Commission's files would seem
to come under this provision, but it fails to cover the situation where the
data and documents needed do not become apparent until after the hear-
ing when the decision is being prepared. The Act further provides a list
of items of which the Commission may take judicial notice,'59 and these
include annual reports of public utilities on file with the Commission. No
mention is made of special reports' 60 or data otherwise accumulated in
the files. When a decision relies on judicial notice of material facts, this
" K. DAVIS, ADmI~xNIsrRATIvE LAW, CASES-TEXT PROBLEMS 585 (1965). The
criticism is contained in a discussion entitled "A Comprehensive Criticism of the
Revised Model State Administrative Procedure Act." Id. 581.
2 DAvis § 15.10.N.C. GEN. STAT. § 62-65(a) (1965).
... The term "judicial" instead of "official" notice is used since the provision
applies when the Commission is acting as a court of record. N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 62-65(a) (1965).
.. The Commission may require special reports. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 62-36
(1965). . -
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shall be stated with particularity in the decision, and any party on petition
after service of the decision shall be afforded an opportunity to contest in
a rehearing the purported facts noticed. But the Commission may notify
the parties before or during the hearing of the facts judicially noticed
and afford opportunity at the hearing to contest them.16' The opportunity
to contest noticed facts in a rehearing after a decision handicaps the party
since he must induce the agency to change a decision already made.1 62
An official notice statute along the lines suggested in the above dis-
cussion of the Revised Model Act and applicable to administrative agencies
generally could be an improvement on these provisions of the Public Utility
Act.
A variation on the usual set of facts in which official notice is involved
appeared in a North Carolina case. Usually official notice involves facts or
evidence existing at the time of the hearing. In the North Carolina case,
the facts arose subsequent to the hearing. The court, after noting that
the procedure before the Commission is not as formal as that in the
superior court, stated that the statutes prescribing procedure for Com-
mission hearings do not prohibit it from making a finding as to an
applicant's ability to render service on the basis of facts arising between
the conclusion of the hearing and the entry of the order when those facts
are shown by late exhibits and the adverse party has had adequate notice
that the exhibits have been filed with the Commission for inclusion in the
record. The court pointed out that the adversely affected party unques-
tionably had the right to demand a reopening of the hearing for the
purpose of cross-examination and rebuttal evidence, but the court cited
no authority for this unquestionable right. However, the adversely
affected party had sought no such reopening.163
D. Affidavits
Professor Wigmore states that mere affidavits are inadmissible.164
The Court of Appeals of North Carolina, in a child custody case not
involving an administrative agency, 6 5 stated most impressive reasons
why an affidavit is an inherently weak method of proof. Those reasons
included lack of cross-examination, "which provides the best instru-
...N.C. GEN. STAT. § 62-65(b) (1965).
182 2 DAVIs § 15.10.
"' State ex rel. Util. Comm'n v. Carolina Tel. & Tel. Co., 267 N.C. 257, 148
S.E.2d 100 (1966).
'"5 WIGMORE § 1384; 6 Id. § 1709. Some exceptions are noted.In re Custody of Griffin, 6 N.C. App. 375, 170 S.E.2d 84 (1969). The court
discussed exceptions in limited situations to the inadmissibility of affidavits."
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mentality our experience has yet devised for assessing the true value of
testimony."1 6  The objections which the court noted to affidavits appear
equally strong when administrative adjudications are involved.16
According to Professor Wigmore, statutes in numerous jurisdictions
"permit a party to file an affidavit, with notice, and await the opponent's
counter-notice either disputing the affidavit or demanding cross-examina-
tion of the affiant; in the absence of such counter-notice, the affidavit may
be used at trial." This is a "virtual waiver" of the right of cross-
examination.6 s
North Carolina has a comparable statute applicable in connection with
evidence before the Public Utilities Commission. The statute provides for
mailing or delivery by any party or the Commission to the opposing
parties of a copy of any affidavit proposed to be used in evidence, together
with a notice containing the name and address of the affiant and a state-
ment that he will not be called to testify orally nor be subject to cross-
examination unless the opposing parties or the Commission demand the
right of cross-examination by notice. Unless the opposing party or the
Commission mails or delivers to the proponent a request to cross-examine
at the hearing, the right to cross-examine is waived and the affidavit, if
introduced, has the same effect as if the affiant had testified orally. If
opportunity to cross-examine is not afforded after the request, the affidavit
shall not be received in evidence."0 9
If a similar statutory provision for use of affidavits by administrative
agencies generally were adopted, it would probably eliminate the objec-
tions to their use.
E. Privilege
The Revised Model State Administrative Procedure Act states flatly
that in contested cases, "Agencies shall give effect to the rules of privilege
recognized by law.""'7 The same position is taken in substance in various
...6 N.C. App. at 378, 170 S.E.2d at 85-86. The court reversed the lower
court for admitting affidavits as to the mother's unfitness.
... Note, Administrative Law-Evidence-Hearsay and the Right of Con-
frontation, in Administrative Hearings, 48 N.C.L. REv. 608 (1970), criticizes the
holding of Peters v. United States, 408 F.2d 719 (Ct. Cl. 1969), that an admin-
istrative adjudication founded on affidavits is valid.
.0 5 WIGMoRE § 1382.
... N.C. GEr. STAT. § 62-68 (1965).
' REVISED MODEL STATE ADMINIsTRATIVE PROCEDURE AcT § 10(1) (1961).
Professor Davis approves, 2 DAvis § 14.06, and mentions three instances of priv-
ilege-that against self-incrimination, attorney and client, and offer of compromise-
which should be the same in administrative as in judicial proceedings. Id. § 14.08,
at 286-87.
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North Carolina statutes, 7 ' including the 1967 Act,172 but the provisions
are fragmentary in that they do not apply to all administrative agencies.
A uniform provision like that in the Model Act might well be enacted
for this state. Recognition of a privilege is a policy decision concerning
which the nature of the tribunal seems irrelevant.
F. Substantial Evidence
The Federal Administrative Procedure Act' and at least one North
Carolina statute 74 lay down as one requirement for the evidence on which
an administrative agency may base a decision that the evidence be "sub-
stantial." These provisions are directed to the agency. The Federal
Administrative Procedure Act also makes this same requirement for
evidence supporting an agency's decision and findings on judicial review,175
and North Carolina statutes commonly lay down "substantial evidence"
as one such requirement. 76
Professor Davis states that the dominant tendency in both state and
federal courts is toward the substantial evidence rule, that under it the
court limits itself to the test of reasonableness in reviewing findings of
fact, and that the judicial tendency toward the substantial evidence rule
is so strong that the rule is often followed even when the statute provides
a narrower or broader scope of review. 117
.1 The licensing board statute provides that in license suspension, revocation,
or nonrenewal cases, rules of privilege shall be applicable as in proceedings before
the courts of this state. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150-18 (1964). When the Utilities
Commission acts as a court of record, the rules of privilege shall be effective as in
civil actions in the superior court. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 62-65(a) (1965). The
statute governing proceedings by the Board of Medical Examiners provides that it
shall admit evidence in the same manner as prescribed by law for civil actions.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-14.6 (1965). This provision would obviously make the rules
of privilege the same as in such court proceedings. A provision relating to the
Employment Security Commission denies the privilege against self-incrimination
but contains an immunity clause. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 96-4(j) (1965).
' N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-318(1) (Supp. 1969), provides that the rules of evi-
dence applied in the superior and district court divisions of the General Court of
Justice shall be followed.
1785 U.S.C. § 556(d) (Supp. V, 1970).
""N.C. GEN. STAT. § 62-65(a) (1965) (concerning the Public Utilities Com-
mission).
'*5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(E) (Supp. V, 1970).178N.C. GEN. STAT. § 62-94(b) (5) (Supp. 1969); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-14.10
(1965); N.C. GEN. STAT. §143-315(5) (1964); N.C. GEN. STAT. §150-27(5)
(1964).
217 4 DAvIs § 29.01. The substantial evidence test is criticized in 2 CooPER 724-
29 on the ground, among others, that it fails to provide a meaningful criterion for
judicial review.
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The Supreme Court has read "evidence" to mean "substantial ev-
idence." '
Up to this point in this article, much of the discussion has been con-
cerned with the question of the kind of evidence required for admin-
istrative adjudications. The substantial evidence requirement goes be-
yond the question, "what kind," to include the question, "how much."
The Supreme Court has said, "Substantial evidence is more than a mere
scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might
accept as adequate to support a conclusion.1 79 It "must do more than
create the suspicion of the existence of the fact to be established ...
[I]t must be enough to justify, if the trial were to a jury, a refusal to
direct a verdict when the conclusion sought to be drawn from it is one
of fact for the jury." 8 0
However, the substantial evidence rule is a variable.' Lack of uni-
formity in results has led to criticism of the rule,'8 2 but a realistic state-
ment by the Supreme Court should be borne in mind. The Court said,
"A formula for judicial review of administrative action... cannot assure
certainty of application. Some scope for judicial discretion in applying
the formula can be avoided only by falsifying the actual process of judg-
ing ....
The Supreme Court of North Carolina, in a number of cases, has
decided whether an administrative agency's findings were supported by
"competent, material and substantial evidence" without indicating any
test as to how much evidence would be deemed substantial. 8 " But in one
... Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938); Washington,
Va., & Md. Coach Co. v. NLRB, 301 U.S. 142, 146-47 (1937).
... Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938).
"" NLRB v. Columbian Enameling & Stamping Co., 306 U.S. 292, 300 (1939).
The quoted language is repeated in Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S.
474, 477 (1951), and the stated test of enough evidence to justify refusal to
direct a verdict remains the law under the Administrative Procedure Act. 4
DAVIS § 29.02, at 120.
1814 DAVIS § 29.02.
1822 COOPER 725.
" Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 488-89 (1951).
"' State ex rel. Util. Comm'n v. Carolina Coach Co., 261 N.C. 384, 3,89, 134
S.E.2d 689, 693-94 (1964) (The court found no evidence to support the Com-
mission's findings.); Jarrell v. Board of Adjustment, 258 N.C. 476, 481, 128
S.E.2d 879, 883 (1963) ; State ex rel. Util. Comm'n v. Carolinas Comm. for Indus.
Power Rates & Area Dev., Inc., 257 N.C. 560, 571, 126 S.E.2d 325, 334 (1962).
In State ex rel. Util. Comm'n v. Ryder Tank Line, Inc., 259 N.C. 363, 130 S.E.2d
663 (1963), the court rehearsed some of the direct testimony of witnesses showing
the need for proposed service and pronounced the evidence "substantial." There
could have been no doubt about it.
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case it did say that "substantial" evidence is "more than a scintilla."' 8
In a recent case l s 6 in which the Utilities Commission had allowed a
rate increase, the court analyzed evidence and other findings of the Com-
mission and said that the Commission's finding as to the fair value of the
utility's property "must be deemed unsupported by substantial evidence
in the record."'1 7 Here apparently "substantial evidence" meant evidence
which upon analysis would lead to the finding.
G. The Whole Record Rule
On the issue whether an administrative adjudication is supported by
substantial evidence, it can be argued that only the evidence supporting
the agency decision need be looked to; if it is substantial, the decision
meets the test. The Supreme Court in a leading case stated that the
Court's prior phrasing of the process of review "readily lent itself to the
notion that it was enough that the evidence supporting the Board's
[National Labor Relations Board's] result was 'substantial' when con-
sidered by itself."' The Court noted the widespread criticism of this
view and the change made by the Federal Administrative Procedure Act
which provided, as quoted by the Court, that the reviewing court shall
"hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found
to be . . . (5) unsupported by substantial evidence .... In making the
foregoing determinations the court shall review the whole record or such
portions thereof as may be cited by any party ...."-189
The Court held that under the whole record provision of the Federal
Administrative Procedure Act, "[ihe substantiality of evidence must
take into account whatever in the record fairly detracts from its weight."9 0
-Put otherwise, substantiality is not determined by viewing in isolation the
evidence supporting the administrative agency, but by viewing it in the
light of the rest of the evidence in the record to see if it is still sub-
stantial when so viewed.
The Federal Administrative Procedure Act also prescribes the whole
record rule for the administrative agency in making its determination.''
18 State ex rel. Util. Comm'n v. Great S. Trucking Co., 223 N.C. 687, 690, 28
S.E.2d 201, 203 (1943).18 State ex rel. Util. Comm'n v. Morgan, 277 N.C. 255, 177 S.E.2d 405 (1970).
187 Id. at 270, 177 S.E.2d at 415.
188 Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 477-78 (1951).
.
8 Id. at 482-83 n.15 (emphasis by the Court). These provisions, with some
slight changes in arrangement and wording not affecting the substance, are now
part of 5 U.S.C. § 706 (Supp. V, 1970).
"'
9oUniversal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 488 (1951).
'19' 5 U.S.C. § 556(d) (Supp. V, 1970).
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The whole record rule has been supported by writers on administrative
law.. 2 and widely adopted. 19 3 Whatever the test of the sufficiency of the
evidence, the evidence is to be viewed in the light of the whole record.
Thus, the Revised Model State Administrative Procedure Act specifies,
The court may reverse or modify the decision if substantial rights
of the appellant have been prejudiced because the administrative find-
ings, inferences, conclusions, or decisions are:
(5) clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative, and sub-
stantial evidence on the whole record .... 194
The statutes in North Carolina concerning the whole record require-
ment are diverse. One of the statutes set forth above which concern North
Carolina administrative agencies prescribes the whole record rule to be
followed by the agency, namely the Utilities Commission.195 The whole
record rule is also prescribed in the most important North Carolina stat-
utory provisions for judicial review of administrative agency adjudica-
tions, including the general judicial review statute, quoted earlier, the
language of which is closely followed in the licensing board statute9 6 and
the Public Utilities Act.
197
The requirement for the agency's evidence on judicial review is
different in the quoted provision of the Revised Model State Admin-
istrative Procedure Act from the provision quoted previously from the
North Carolina general judicial review statute, but whether the require-
ment, whichever it may be, is met is to be determined on the whole record
under both provisions.
On the other hand, some North Carolina statutes, if their language
is taken literally, are directly contrary to the whole record rule. The
statute covering appeal from the Employment Security Commission in
claims cases provides that the Commission's findings of fact are con-
clusive "if there is evidence" to support them. 9 ' In cases involving the
rights, status, and liabilities of employers, the language is more emphatic:
The Commission's decision shall be conclusive "as to all questions of fact
1 24 DAVIs § 29.03; L. JAFFE, JUDIcIAL CONTROL OF ADmINISTRATIVE AcrIoN
601 (1965). The whole record rule is briefly discussed by Hanft, Administrative
Law, Survey of North Carolina Case Law, 45 N.C.L. REv. 816 (1967).
1022 COOPER 730-33 cites some state statutes embodying the rule.
10& REVISED MODEL STATE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE AcT § 15(g) (1961).00N.C. GEN. STAT. § 62-65 (a) (1965), quoted p. 649 supra.
100 N.C. GEN..STAT. § 150-27 (1964).
"",N.C. GEN. STAT. § 62-94(b) (Supp. 1969).
.o0 N.C. GEN. STAT. §96-15(i) (Supp. 1969).
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supported by any competent evidence."' 19 In appeals from denials of a
medical license, the decision of the Board of Medical Examiners is to be
upheld unless the decision is not supported by "any evidence admissible
under this article."20 In appeals in license suspension and revocation
cases, the test is "competent, material, and substantial evidence admissible
under this article."201 The emphatic word "any" does not appear.
One important statute, that governing appeals from the Industrial
Commission, 2 2 makes no provision at all concerning what evidence is
sufficient to support the Commission's decision or findings on appeal.
The North Carolina cases concerning the whole record rule are, so
far as the language of the court goes, highly diverse. In a case involving
an appeal from the Utilities Commission, the court set out both the stat-
utory provision requiring the Commission to act upon competent, material,
and substantial evidence upon consideration of the whole record and the
provision authorizing reversal on judicial review for lack of support by
such evidence in view of the entire record. The court on rehearsal of the
evidence concluded that it did not support the findings.20 ' The case,
however, was one in which the court found no evidence supporting the
Commission's finding concerning public convenience and necessity, and,
thus, there was no whole record problem involving evidence supporting the
Commission's findings being viewed in the light of contrary evidence.
In other cases involving appeals from the Utilities Commission, the
court in a variety of situations has made pronouncements on the evidence
before the Commission. The court has stated that the Commission's find-
ings of fact were supported by competent, material, and substantial evidence
without adding such language as "on the whole record."204 The question
in the case, however, was what the evidence showed. The court in another
case said that the Commission's findings are binding on appeal if supported
by competent, material, and substantial evidence, again without adding
any whole record language. 2 5 The court found no evidence supporting
the findings. In neither of these last two cases did any whole record
"' N.C. GEN. STAT. § 96-4(m) (1965) (emphasis added).
"' N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-14.1 (1965).I"1N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-14.10 (1965).
"'
2N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-86 (Supp. 1969).
"8 State ex rel. Util. Comm'n v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 268 N.C. 242, 150
S.E.2d 386 (1966).
... State ex rel. Util. Comm'n v. Carolinas Comm. for Indus. Power Rates &
Area Dev., Inc., 257 N.C. 560, 571, 126 S.E.2d 325, 334 (1962).
..5 State ex rel. Util. Comm'n v. Carolina Coach Co., 261 N.C. 384, 389, 134
S.E.2d 689, 693 (1964).
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problem appear. In another case the court did say that a court on appeal
is to review the whole record or parts cited,2"' but said that there was
ample competent evidence to support the Commission's finding.2"7 Again,
no whole record problem appeared. In a different case, the court recited
the whole record formula208 but found the evidence to be clear and un-
disputed and to be contrary to the Commission's finding.20 9 This being so,
the outcome would again have been the same without the whole record
provision.
However, two decisions are more to the point. In one in which there
was evidence both ways, the court held that the Commission's findings
were supported by competent, material, and substantial evidence in view
of the entire record.210 In the other case the court held that the Com-
mission's finding was not so supported although there was some evidence
supporting it.21 '
Since the review of evidence provisions under the general judicial
review statute and the licensing board statute are the same as those in
the statute providing for review of decisions by the Utilities Commission,
these precedents have value under the other two statutes.
Cases applying the statutory provisions making the findings of the
Employment Security Commission conclusive if supported by "any
competent evidence" and "evidence" respectively have been reviewed
previously in this article. The language of the statutory provisions and
accordingly the tests applied in the court decisions are at variance with
the whole record rule.
In North Carolina cases involving judicial review of decisions by the
Industrial Commission for which there is no statutory provision con-
cerning review of the evidence, there are diverse statements concerning
such review. In one of them21 the only evidence that an employee was
killed by electric shock while working on a pole was the testimony of a
doctor that if the employee had come into contact with electric current,
200 State ex rel. Util. Comm'n v. Nello L. Teer Co., 266 N.C. 366, 373, 146
S.E.2d 511, 516 (1966).207 Id. at 377, 146 S.E.2d at 519.
20' State ex rel. Util. Comm'n v. Gulf-Atlantic Towing Corp., 251 N.C. 105, 109,
110 S.E.2d 886, 889 (1959).201 Id. at 112, 110 S.E.2d at 891.
210 State ex rel. Util. Comm'n v. Champion Papers, Inc., 259 N.C. 449, 130
S.E.2d 890 (1963').
2. State ex rel. Util. Comm'n v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 233 N.C. 365, 64
S.E.2d 272 (1951).P.. p. 654-55 supra.
21 Petree v. Duke Power Co., 268 N.C. 419, 150 S.E.2d 749 (1966).
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it could have caused the death. The court pointed out that overwhelming
evidence showed that the electricity had been turned off where the em-
ployee was working. There was other evidence that the employee had
suffered no electric shock. The court said, "It is so well settled that if
there is any evidence upon which the Commission can base its findings
they must be upheld we need cite no authorities. But it is equally correct
that the Commission's findings must be supported by some evidence." 214
The language of the court is emphatically contrary to the whole record
rule, but the holding invalidating the award is plainly in accord with it.
In another case 215 there was evidence that an employee's disability was
caused by accident arising out of and in the course of his employment,
but there was also evidence of the employee's history of osteomylitis and
of an operation for it about ten years before the accident. The court in
reversing the lower court, which had set aside an award by the Com-
mission, said, "The court's duty goes no further than to determine
whether the record contains any evidence tending to support the find-
ing."216 The court did not mention the whole record rule, and the outcome
may well have been the same under it, but again the language of the
court is contrary to that rule.
The court has said that the Commission's findings of fact are con-
clusive on appeal if supported by "any evidence"217 in a case in which it
found no evidence to support the findings and which therefore did not
involve application of the whole record rule, although the court's language
negated it. The court has also said that the Commission's findings are
conclusive when supported by "competent evidence, '21 8 but in the same
connection the court has used the language "any competent evidence.)2 19
"
1
'Id. at 420, 150 S.E.2d at 750 (emphasis by the court).
.
1
.Anderson v. Lincoln Constr. Co., 265 N.C. 431, 144 S.E.2d 272 (1965).
.. Id. at 434, 144 S.E.2d at 274. In Hoilman v. City of Raleigh, 273 N.C. 240,
249, 159 S.E.2d 874, 880 (1968), the court quoting Anderson again stated that the
reviewing court's duty goes no further than to determine whether the record con-
tains any evidence tending to support the finding. However, in this case the ques-
tion was as to the weight and sufficiency of the evidence supporting the award,
and that evidence was not considered in connection with contrary evidence.
" Hensley v. Farmers Fed'n Coop., 246 N.C. 274, 276, 98 S.E.2d 289, 290-91
(1957).
218 Byrd v. Farmers Fed'n Coop., 260 N.C. 215, 216, 132 S.E.2d 348, 348-49
(1963). (The decision involved a conclusion from the evidence, not conflicting
evidence.); Graham v. Wall, 220 N.C. 84, 88, 16 S.E.2d 691, 693 (1941). (The
decision involved a conclusion from the evidence.)
219 Penland v. Bird Coal Co., 246 N.C. 26, 30, 97 S.E.2d 432, 435 (1957) ; see
note 95 supra. In Penland the court held that an injured employee's statements
to his doctor in the course of professional treatment or during examination may be
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In two recent cases decided by the Court of Appeals of North Carolina
in which there was medical testimony both for and against an employee's
claim, the court upheld the determination of the Commission. In one of
the cases, 220 the court said that the Commission's finding must be accepted
if supported by "competent evidence,"22 1 and in the other22 2 it said that
the question for the court was whether there was "sufficient competent
evidence" to support the finding' and that where the evidence is contra-
dictory, the findings are conclusive.224 In another recent case 2 the court
used the more emphatic term, "any competent evidence, ' 228 but the case
was one in which all the medical evidence supported the finding.
The writer concludes that the North Carolina courts, in describing the
evidence sufficient to make the findings of the Industrial Commission con-
clusive on appeal, frequently use the terms "any evidence," "competent
evidence," and "any competent evidence" interchangeably 2 Law would
be more simple, definite, and ascertainable if the same language were used
wherever the same meaning is intended, but legislatures, courts, and legal
writers-the present writer included-do not consistently adhere to any
such ideal.
testified to by the physician to show the basis of his opinion. The court said that
this testimony, plus that of the employee, was ample competent evidence to support
the Commission's findings of fact. However, the court in a later case, Todd v.
Watts, 269 N.C. 417, 152 S.E.2d 448 (1967), seemed to recede from its view in
Penland as to the admissibility of such testimony of a physician. STANsBURY § 136
(Brandis Supp. 1970). The Todd case is discussed in Note, Evidence-Expert
Testimoz-ny-Physiciai's Opinion Based on Patient's Statements, 46 N.C.L. Rnv.
960 (1968).
" Rooks v. Ideal Cement Co., 9 N.C. App. 57, 175 S.E.2d 324 (1970).
Id. at 58-59, 175 S.E.2d at 325-26.
222 Priddy v. Blue Bird Cab Co., 9 N.C. App. 291, 176 S.E.2d 26 (1970).
22 Id. at 296, 176 S.E.2d at 29.
-' Id. at 298, 176 S.E.2d at 30.
.. Snead v. Sandhurst Mills, Inc., 8 N.C. App. 447, 174 S.E.2d 699 (1970).
220 Id. at 450, 174 S.E.2d at 701.
...In Thomason v. Red Bird Cab. Co., 235 N.C. 602, 605, 70 S.E.2d 706, 708
(1952), the court said the Commission's findings of fact are conclusive and binding
on the courts if they are supported by "competent evidence," but it also said that
on appeal the superior court is limited to two questions of law, one of which is
whether there was "any competent evidence" to support the Commission's findings.
The case, however, involved "inadequacy" of the findings. The same two state-
ments are also made in Henry v. A.C. Lawrence Leather Co., 231 N.C. 477, 479,
57 S.E.2d 760, 762 (1950), in which the court held there was no evidence to
support the findings. In Vause v. Vause Farm Equip. Co., 233 N.C. 88, 93 , 63
S.E.2d 173, 177 (1951), the court said a finding by the Commission is conclusive if
supported by "the evidence," but it also said that the finding was conclusive if sup-
ported by "evidence," and it added that on appeal the court may determine
whether there is "any evidence" to support the findings. The court held that none
of the evidence supported the finding that the injury arose out of the employment
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The following statement may be a realistic version of judicial review
of the evidence supporting findings of the Industrial Commission:
It is the duty of the court to determine whether, in any reasonable
view of the evidence, it is sufficient to support the critical findings
necessary to permit an award of compensation. . . If there is any
evidence of substance which directly, or by reasonable inference, tends
to support the findings, the courts are bound by them, "even though
there is evidence that would have supported a finding to the con-
trary."228
No reason is apparent why the whole record requirement should be
provided by statute to govern one administrative agency in adjudicating
cases, but not other administrative agencies; nor why the requirement
should exist in some statutes providing for judicial review of the evidence
before some administrative agencies, but not in other statutes providing
judicial review of other agencies. A statute should be enacted applicable
to administrative agencies generally, and as in the case of the Federal
Administrative Procedure Act, the statute should establish the whole
record requirement for the agencies themselves in adjudicating cases
and for the courts on judicial review of the evidence, whatever may be
the prescribed nature of the evidence. Such a requirement for the agency
itself is exceptional in North Carolina, and it could be argued that it is
not needed since if the whole record rule is prescribed for judicial review,
any failure of the agency to observe it can be corrected. This overlooks
the facts that the agency's decision may not be appealed even when
erroneous and that the agency should be conscious of the rule in making
its determination. It is likely to have the rule in mind if the rule is
in a statute applicable to the agency's own procedures.
H. The Residuum Rule
The leading case establishing the residuum rule is Carroll v. Knicker-
bocker Ice Co. 9 In that case New York's Workmen's Compensation
Commission found as a fact that Carroll, an employee, was putting ice in
the cellar of a saloon when the ice tongs slipped and a three-hundred-
pound cake of ice fell on him, striking him in the abdomen. The only
evidence supporting this finding as to how Carroll was injured was testi-
.. Keller v. Electric Wiring Co., 259 N.C. 222, 223, 130 S.E.2d 342, 343
(1963). The question was what the evidence showed, and no whole record ques-
tion appeared.229218 N.Y. 435, 113 N.E. 507 (1916).
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mony of witnesses who related what Carroll had told them after the acci-
dent. He died in delirium tremens six days after the alleged accident.
Opposed to the hearsay testimony was that of a helper on the ice wagon and
two cooks employed in the saloon who testified that they were present at
the time and place of the alleged injury and that they did not see any cake
of ice fall. The physicians who examined the employee testified that there
were no bruises, discolorations, or abrasions on the surface of his body.
The court, in holding invalid an award of compensation, pointed out that
a statute provided that the Commission shall not be bound by common
law or statutory rules of evidence but may conduct the hearing in such
manner as to ascertain the substantial rights of the parties. The court
accordingly held that the award could not be overturned on account of any
alleged error in receiving evidence. The court then said, "[S]till in the
end there must be a residuum of legal evidence to support the claim . 2.0..",,
The court employed the residuum rule to reach a sound result. The
court must have been aware of the usual cause of delirium tremens al-
though this went unmentioned in the opinion. The direct evidence against
an injury caused by the fall of a cake of ice was formidable. Therefore,
the same result could have been reached by application of the whole record
rule, but that rule did not appear on the legal scene until much later.
The residuum rule was widely adopted, but it was and remains highly
controversial. Professor Wigmore criticized it and argued that the greatest
part of the community's industrial, commercial, and financial activity func-
tions on a solid basis of fact determined without any formal rules of
proof.23' The analogy does not seem entirely sound. A businessman
commonly makes his judgments for his own purposes; he does not judge
between others and impose sanctions. If he commonly did, those subjected
to his judgments might quite likely seek means of insuring that the judg-
ments were founded on at least a residuum of solid evidence. Then there
would be raised, as in administrative law, the issue as to what is solid
evidence.
Professor Davis also vigorously criticizes the residuum rule. 23 ' He
states that the rule requires a reviewing court to set aside an admin-
istrative finding unless it is supported by evidence admissible in a jury
trial.2 8 He takes the position that the reviewing court should be allowed
to exercise discretion in determining in the light of the circumstances
2 0Id. at 440, 113 N.E. at 509.
. 1 WIGMOE § 4b, at 42.
232 2 DAvis § 14.10.
2 8Id. at 291-92.
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of each case whether the particular evidence is reliable even though it would
be excluded in a jury case. He holds that perhaps the strongest reason
against the residuum rule is lack of correlation between reliability of
evidence and the exclusionary rules. m4 He makes the point that the type
of administrative determination should, among other factors, make a
difference; tenuous hearsay should not be a basis for revoking a pro-
fessional license even though it would be deemed enough to support an
award of a social security benefit.2 5
The residuum rule was not adopted in the Federal Administrative
Procedure Act." 6 Professor Davis finds statements in federal cases for
and against the rule, but he concludes that the rule is probably not the law
of the federal courts. m7 He finds that some states clearly support the rule,
some reject it, and some find ways around it such as stretching exceptions
to the hearsay rule.ms
In North Carolina law the substance of the residuum rule is firmly
imbedded. m9 The statutes and cases, reviewed above, requiring that ad-
ministrative findings be supported by competent evidence appear to adopt
or go beyond the residuum requirement,"0 and the statutes and cases
making the administrative findings conclusive if supported by any com-
petent evidence appear to be expressing the residuum rule in other terms.
Professor Davis indicates 1 that in North Carolina the residuum rule
is weakened by the holding in Maley v. Thomasville Furniture Co.24
He also says, "[S] ome state courts that have verbally adopted the residu-
2" Id. at 293-95.232 Id. at 299.
23 It provides that the reviewing court shall set aside agency action, findings, and
conclusions found to be unsupported by substantial evidence. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (E)
(Supp. V, 1970).
"" 2 DAVIS § 14.11. But see Note, Administrative Law-Evidence-Hearsay
and the Right of Confrontation in Administrative Hearings, 48 N.C.L. Rnv. 608,
610 (1970).
... 2 DAvis § 14.12.
... In Note, Administrative Lau-Evidence before North Carolina Tribunal4,
19 N.C.L. REv. 568, 582 (1941), the writer states that the North Carolina decisions
promise a consistent application of the residuum rule.
240 Professor Davis cites as a case supporting the residuum rule Plyler v. Char-
lotte Country Club, 214 N.C. 453, 199 S.E. 622 (1938). 2 DAvis § 14.12, at 323.
That case laid down the competent evidence requirement. Professor Cooper notes
that in North Carolina, citing N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-315 (1964), "the test is
whether the evidence supporting the administrative findings is 'competent' as well
as material and substantial," and he adds, "[T]his arguably imports the legal
residuum test." 2 COOPER 732-33.241 2 DAvIs § 14.12, at 322-23.
242214 N.C. 589, 200 S.E. 438 (1939).
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urn rule permit findings to be based upon circumstantial evidence plus
hearsay even when the circumstantial evidence alone probably would not
support the findings."2 43 For this proposition he cites the Maley case.
His statement does not seem consistent with the court's own declaration:
"But the circumstantial evidence relating to the injury, it seems to us, is
of sufficient probative force to sustain the conclusion that deceased was
injured by accident arising out of his employment ... . The Com-
mission's finding that the injury arose out of the worker's employment
was being disputed. The court also said, "The decisions [North Carolina
decisions] substantially recognize a modification of the strict requirements
of judicial proof, to the extent that the findings and award will not be
disturbed because of the presence in the case of hearsay testimony when
there is other competent evidence, of sufficient probative force, upon which
to base the findings." '45 This sounds more like an affirmation of the
residuum rule than a weakening of it. The case does not appear to have
made inroads on the residuum rule in North Carolina.
The 1967 Act, as to the agencies to which it applies, appears largely
to eliminate any need for the residuum rule since nothing but competent
evidence is admissible by the agencies in the first place.
I. Jurisdictional Fact
A controversial exception to the rule that administrative findings of
fact, if supported by the required evidence, are conclusive on judicial
review is made in the case of jurisdictional facts. In the leading case of
Crowell v. Benson,246 an award of compensation was made under the
Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act in favor of one
Knudsen and against Benson. A deputy commissioner found that the
claimant was injured while in the employment of Benson and while per-
forming service upon the navigable waters of the United States. The
Court reasoned that finality may be given the findings of the deputy, sup-
ported by evidence and within the scope of his authority, concerning the
circumstances, cause, nature, extent, and consequences of the injury. But
the Court further reasoned that where determinations of fact are juris-
dictional in the sense that their existence is a condition precedent to the
operation of the statutory scheme, an administrative agency cannot deter-
... 2 DAvis § 14.12, at 313-14.
2,,214 N.C. at 596, 200 S.E. at 442.2-' Id. at 595, 200 S.E. at 442.
2' 285 U.S. 22 (1932).
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mine such facts with finality. The Court held that the reviewing court is
to determine the jurisdictional facts by a hearing de novo247 and that the
existence of the "relation of master and servant" and the occurrence of
the injury on the navigable waters of the United States are jurisdictional
facts.
The holding has been criticized on the ground that ascertainment of
what is or is not a jurisdictional fact is often difficult or impossible.248 It
is true that the basis for an award without fault of the defendant is the
employer-employee relationship, but it is also required that the injury arise
out of the employment-that is, be caused by it. It is not apparent why
the one fact should be jurisdictional while the other is not. Justice Frank-
furter, in a later concurring opinion, referred to "the casuistic difficulties
spawned by the doctrine of 'jurisdictional fact.'" He added, "In view of
the criticism which that doctrine, as sponsored by Crowell v. Benson...
brought forth and of the attritions of that case through later decisions, one
had supposed that the doctrine had earned a deserved repose."24 It is
said that the doctrine of Crowell is probably no longer law and that most
state. courts reject it.2 5 0
Nevertheless, a distinction in the case of jurisdictional facts is now
firmly imbedded in North Carolina decisions. The supreme court has held
in workmen's compensation cases that the existence of the employer-
employee relation," 1 the requisite number of employees,2 2 and the residence
of the employee25 are jurisdictional issues. The court has also held that
whether the employer was engaged in sawing and logging less than sixty
days during a period of six months254 is jurisdictional. In Askew v.
Leonard Tire Co.,255 the court said that in some cases the question as to
the employer-employee relationship had not been expressly presented as
jurisdictional and that the court in those cases, perhaps unmindful of the
jurisdictional nature of the question, had applied the rule that the Com-
mission's findings of fact are conclusive on appeal when supported by
"'The hearing de novo aspect of this requirement is discussed by Strong, The
Persistent Doctrine of "'Constitutional Fact," 46 N.C.L. Rav. 223 (1968).
2482 DAvis § 16.08; 4 Id. § 29.08.
, Estep v. United States, 327 U.S. 114, 142 (1946).
2804 DAvis § 29.08.
2' Askew v. Leonard Tire Co., 264 N.C. 168, 141 S.E.2d 280 (1965).
"'
2Aycock v. Cooper, 202 N.C. 500, 163 S.E. 569 (1932).
... Aylor v. Barnes, 242 N.C. 223, 87 S.E.2d 269 (1955).
... Burns v. Riddle, 265 N.C. 705, 144 S.E.2d 847 (1965).
22264 N.C. 168, 141 S.E.2d 280 (1965).
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competent evidence, which, said the court, is the rule as to findings of non-
jurisdictional facts. 56 The court cited cases in which the judge on review
made independent findings of jurisdictional facts, and the supreme court
approved.157 The court went on to declare to be settled law the rule that
the superior court has both the power and the duty to consider all the
evidence in the record and find therefrom the jurisdictional facts without
regard to the Commission's finding of such facts. The latter is not con-
clusive even though supported by competent evidence."' 8
J. Comstitutional Fact
Another controversial exception to the rule that administrative find-
ings of fact, if supported by the required evidence, are conclusive on judical
review is the doctrine of independent judicial determination of constitu-
tional facts, which are facts on which constitutionality of a decision de-
pends. "" The doctrine of constitutional facts has been extensively dis-
"I Included in the cases cited by the court for its statement are Hawes v. Mutual
Benefit Health & Accident Ass'n, 243 N.C. 62, 89 S.E.2d 739 (1955); Hinkle v.
City of Lexington, 239 N.C. 105, 79 S.E.2d 220 (1953). Professor Davis includes
one North Carolina case, Scott v. Waccamaw Lumber Co., 232 N.C. 162, 59 S.E.2d
425 (1950), in listing state courts which have used the substantial evidence (actually
in Waccanmaw the competent evidence) rule on questions concerning the existence
of the employer-employee relation. He includes none of the North Carolina cases
upholding the jurisdictional fact doctrine as to the employer-employee relation. 4
DAvis § 29.08, at n.42. In Note, Workmen's Compensation--Analysis of "Juris-
dictional Fact" Review by Superior Courts, 37 N.C.L. Rxv. 219 (1959), North
Carolina cases on the jurisdictional fact rule are discussed, and the rule is criticized.
" The cases cited include Richards v. Nationwide Homes, 263 N.C. 295, 139
S.E.2d 645 (1965) (The parties stipulated that the superior court judge might find
the facts, but the opinion of the supreme court did not rely on the stipulation.);
Aycock v. Cooper, 202 N.C. 500, 163 S.E. 569 (1932).
..
8 The court in Askew formulated rules concerning when the reviewing court
must make its own findings of jurisdictional fact and when it will be deemed to
have adopted the Commission's findings thereon. The decision is discussed by Hanft,
Administrative Law, North Carolina Case Law, 44 N.C.L. REv. 889, 892-96 (1966).
." In Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22 (1932), the Court put the independent
judicial determination of jurisdictional facts on a constitutional fact basis. The
Court said:
If the person injured was not an employee of the person sought to be held,
or if the injury did not occur upon the navigable waters of the United States,
there is no ground for an assertion that the person against whom the pro-
ceeding was directed could constitutionally be subjected, in the absence of
fault on his part, to the liability which the statute creates.
285 U.S. at 56. The Court further said, "We think that the essential independence
of the exercise of the judicial power of the United States in the enforcement of
constitutional rights requires that the Federal court should determine such an
issue [jurisdiction] upon its own record and the facts elicited before it." 285 U.S.
at 64.
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cussed in recent articles by Professor Strong00 and will not be re-
examined here.
IV. CONCLUSIONS AND PROSPECTS FOR IMPROVEMENT
The North Carolina statutes and decisions concerning evidence before
administrative agencies in the adjudication of cases contain wide varia-
tions in provisions, holdings, and statements concerning different agencies,
and sometimes the same agency, often with no apparent justification for
the differences. Of course, the kinds of agencies and the types of their
adjudications also vary widely, but this fact has not precluded the value
of administrative procedure acts applicable to the agencies generally.
-The General Statutes Commission of North Carolina has at work a
Drafting Committee on Administrative Procedure composed of experts
in the field charged with the task of studying proposals for a State Admin-
istrative Procedure Act.2 1 If the Committee submits a draft of such an
act to the Commission, the latter, after detailed consideration, may decide
to submit such legislation to the General Assembly.2
Among matters needing consideration are the following: First, what
evidence may an administrative agency receive in an adjudicatory pro-
ceeding? Second, on judicial review is the agency to be reversed for
receiving inadmissible evidence? Third, on what evidence may the agency
make its findings and decision? Fourth, on judicial review what evidence
will support the findings and determination of the agency?
With reference to what evidence an administrative agency may receive,
the 1967 Act is at one extreme. The Act's requirement that the admin-
istrative agencies subject to it exclude incompetent and hearsay evidence
imposes a requirement which agencies not manned by lawyers are ill
adapted to fulfill. It is an odd feature of the Act that three named agencies
excluded from its coverage are probably better qualified to observe its
requirements than are many agencies to which it applies. It is difficult to
envisage a board manned by dentists2  or barbers2 4 ruling on the com-
petence of evidence. The 1967 Act should be replaced.
... Strong, Dilemmic Aspects of the Doctrine of "Constitutional Fact," 47 N.C.L.
REv. 311 (1969); Strong, The Persistent Doctrine of "Constitutional Fact," 46
N.C.L. REv. 223 (1968).
"'
1 THE GENERAL STATUTES COMM'N, BIENNIAL REPORT TO THE GENERAL
ASSEmBLY OF NORTH CAROLINA 34 (1971).
s:" The Commission's procedure in formulating such major legislation is dis-
cussed by Hanft, The North Carolina General Statutes Commission, 46 N.C.L. REv.
469 (1968).
"
8N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-22(b) (1965).
.. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 86-6 (1965).
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ADMINISTRATIVE EVIDENCE RULES
At the other extreme is the view that an administrative agency should
be permitted to receive any evidence so long as its findings and deter-
mination are supported by prescribed evidence. An argument against this
view is that if the agency receives evidence deemed not of the kind required
to support its findings and determination, it may be influenced by that
evidence to make a determination it would not have made on the evidence
received of the prescribed kind.
Some middle ground-such as the requirement that the evidence re-
ceived be "reliable, probative, and substantial"--can of course be chosen.
These terms are more likely to be within the grasp of the members of the
agencies.
If an agency receives evidence not of a prescribed kind, the view that
the findings and determination will be upheld on judicial review if there
is sufficient supporting evidence of a required kind seems sound, but the
presence of the illicit evidence may well lead the court to be more exacting
with reference to the supporting evidence.
As to a provision stating to the agencies the evidence on which they
are to act, the possibilities again are varied. The North Carolina Public
Utilities Act requirement of "competent material and substantial ev-
idence"'261 is strict, and if applied to state agencies generally, it would
oblige them to know the rules as to the competence of evidence. One
alternative is the Federal Administrative Procedure Act requirement of
"reliable, probative, and substantial evidence." '66 Whatever the test, the
whole record rule should be included.
As brought out in this article, there is a wide variety of North Car-
olina statutory provisions prescribing the kind of evidence required to
support on judicial review the findings and determinations of agencies.
Additional possibilities are the Federal Administrative Procedure Act
provision for setting aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found
to be "unsupported by substantial evidence"26 and the Revised Model State
Administrative Procedure Act provision for reversing or modifying the
decision when the administrative findings, inferences, conclusions, or
decisions are "clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative, and
substantial evidence."26 Again the whole record rule should be included
in the test.
... N.C. GEN. STAT. § 62-65(a) (1965).
:' 5 U.S.C. § 556(d) (Supp. V, 1970).
2875 U.S.C. § 706(2) (E) (Supp. V, 1970).
.8 REVISED MODEL STATE ADMINISTRATIVE PRocEDuE AcT § 15 (g) (5) (1961).
1971]
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Whatever the formula for judicial review of the evidence may be, the
words of Justice Franldurter will furnish its setting. "[T]he precise way
in which courts interfere with agency findings cannot be imprisoned
within any form of words .... 269
The provision is discussed in 2 COOPER 724-30 and criticized by K. DAVIs, AIDIMh-
ISTRATIVE LAW, CASES-TExT-PRoBLEMS 587-88 (1965).
2"' Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 489 (1951). A similar view
is elaborated by 4 DAvis § 29.02.
